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INTRODUCTION
Is the legal process a feasible venue for defusing Europe's
Islam-based tensions? Legal actions have become a hard-to-miss
component in the intense political debates over the place of
Islam in the European public sphere, often denying the public
manifestations of Islamic identity. This Article rethinks the role
of the legal process in these debates by drawing upon the
cultural controversies over abortion reform, which engulfed
Western Europe from the late 1960s to the late 1980s. Legal
measures regulating abortion ultimately pacified these
controversies, driving the abortion issue off into the peripheries
of Western European politics.
Pairing these salient culture-based debates may seem
unconventional at first as abortion reforms primarily challenged
* Lecturer on Law and Politics, Department of Government, Harvard University.
Earlier versions of this article were presented at the Religious Norms in the Public Sphere
(RPS) Workshop, Florence, Dec. 16-17, 2010 and the International Conference on judicial
Politics and the Accommodation of Religious Minorities, Toronto, Apr. 28-30, 2011. The
author extends her deepest gratitude to Mark Tushnet, Christopher Kutz, Matthias
Koenig, Joseph Carens, Silvio Ferrari,Jytte Klausen, Anna Korteweg, and the organizers
and participants in these workshops for their insightful comments.
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the place of Europe's dominant religion. However, a
comparison of the two issues invites an opportunity to infer
relations between the usage of the legal process in cultural
conflicts and law's impact on the outcome of such conflicts.
Moreover, several broad commonalities seem to characterize the
political and legal dimensions of the regulation of abortion and
Islamic practices across Western Europe. First, using Stokes's
classification, both have been passionately and acrimoniously
debated as positional (rather than valence) issues, with little
inclination for compromise.' Second, both issues involved the
regulation of personal choices, with gender-based concerns at
their centers. Third, each of these debates has been connected
to broader socio-political processes engaging questions about
European identity and the place of religion in the modern,
secular state. Finally, since the geographical location and the
legal mechanisms are held constant across the two case studies,
their comparison can test whether the intensity of the presentday conflicts involving abortion and Islam could be explained in
light of the diverging social role of the legal process in each
debate.
Voluminous century-spanning literature emphasized two
principal functions of the legal process: (i) Integrative, classifying
law as a mechanism of governance that manages conflict and
facilitates social order, and (ii) Transformative, perceiving law to
be a vehicle to express values and advance social and political
change. 2 This Article argues that law has been acting as a
1. Donald Stokes, Spatial Models of Party Competition, 57 AM. POL. SC. REV. 368,
368-77 (1963), reprinted in ANGUS CAMPBELL ET AL., UNIV. OF MICH. SURVEY RESEARCH
CTR., ELECTION AND THE POLITICAL ORDER 161-79 (1966).
2. In the nineteenth century, the formative sociological works of Maine,
Durkheim and Weber, which traced the evolution of society from pre-modern state to
its industrialized form, identified law's functions as providing rules, institutions and
processes to facilitate social interaction and achieve social goals. See EMILE DURKHEIM,
ON THE DIVISIONS OF LABOUR INSOCIETY (1893); HENRY SUMNER MAINE, ANCIENT LAW:
THE EARLY HISTORY OF INSTITUTIONS (1888); MAX WEBER, ECONOMY AND SOCIETY
(1914). In the twentieth century, sociological jurisprudence including HUNTINGTON
CAIRNS, THE THEORY OF LEGAL SCIENCE 55-56 (1941) and ROSCOE POUND, SOCIAL
CONTROL THROUGH LAW 64-65 (1942), legal realism of Karl N. Llewellyn, The

Normative, the Legal, and the Law-Jobs: The Problem ofJuristic Method, 49 YALE L.J. 1355,
1373 (1940), and the functionalist theory of Talcott Parsons, The Law and Social Control,
in LAW AND SocIoocY: EXPLORATORY ESSAYS 56, 58 (William M. Evan ed., 1962) and
NIKLAS LUHMANN, LAW AS A SOCIAL SYSTEM 164 (Fatima Kastner et al. eds., Klaus A.
Ziegert trans., 2004) have also emphasized law's facilitative and engineering functions.
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transformative device in current Islam-based conflicts engaging
Western-European countries with substantial Islamic population,
compared with law's integrative role in past political debates in
these countries over abortion reform. Using examples from
Germany, Italy, France, Belgium, Britain, the Netherlands, and
Switzerland, this Article seeks to demonstrate that legal actions
concerning rights of Muslim minorities typically focused on
generating social and cultural change. In prescribing legal norms

pertaining to Islamic practices, courts and legislatures have been
pursuing by-and-large political goals of assimilation and
secularization, thus foreclosing the likelihood of political
compromise. In contrast, when these nations debated abortion
reform, legal processes acted as a mechanism of social and
cultural order. Courts and legislatures framed debates beyond the
clash of rights or worldviews, generating legal arrangements that
incorporated additional social and public policy concerns for
the purpose of generating compromises. This process had a
calming effect on abortion politics.
Drawing upon these comparative findings, this Article
argues that the legal process, and in particular the distinct
Western-European model of constitutional review, suggests an
opportunity to act differently in present debates over Islam. In
short, Europe's predominant political emphasis on reforming
Islam by way of legal means should make way for the utilization
of law's conflict-management capabilities, by institutionalizing
dialogue and compromise-building measures in regulating the
role of Islam in the European public sphere. This Article
proceeds in three parts. Part I analyzes the evolution of legal
arrangements pertaining to Islamic practices across Western
Europe, followed by a comparable exploration in Part II of the
legal evolution in the context of abortion. In Part III, the Article
discerns the diverging role that law has come to play in each of
these cultural debates, and concludes with a proposed
compromise-oriented path for legal deliberations over Islam's
public place in Western Europe.

See also STEVEN VAGO, LAW AND SOCIETY 18-21 (7th ed. 2003) (discussing the functions
of law and especially the social engineering function).
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I. REGULATION OFISLAM-BASED PRACTICES
The Muslim population in Western Europe originated from
different parts of the globe, primarily as labor migration or
asylum seekers during the second part of the twentieth century.Expanding to become Europe's largest cultural minority, this
community has been facing an uphill integration process
complicated by institutional opportunities for discrimination,
socio-economic barriers, and a growing negative public
perception of Islam.4 This Part will not attempt a comprehensive
depiction of Islam's legal status across Western Europe. Rather,
in an endeavor to decipher the relationship between an intense
Muslim integration debate and the usage of the legal process,
this Part surveys a selection of legal arrangements emerging
from recurring Islam-based controversies. As will be shown, in
the processes of regulating Islamic dress, halal slaughtering,
Muslim immigration, and the building of Islamic worship places,

3.

MUSLIMS IN 21sr CENTURY EUROPE: STRUCTURAL AND CULTURAL PERSPECTIVES

13 (Anna Triandafyllidou ed., 2010).
4. SeeJosd Casanova, Religion, European Secular Identities, and European Integration,
in RELIGION IN AN EXPANDING EUROPE 65, 78-80, (Timothy A. Byrnes & Peter J.
Katzenstein eds., 2006); Burak Erdenir, Islamophobia Qua Racial Discrimination:
Muslimophobia, in MUSLIMS IN 21ST CENTURY EUROPE: STRUCTURAL AND CULTURAL
PERSPECTIVES, supra note 3, at 27, 27; EUROPEAN ISLAM: CHALLENGES FOR PUBLIC

POLICY AND SOCIETY 3 (Samir Amghar et al. eds., 2007); Silvio Ferrari, Islam in Europe:
An Introduction to Legal Problems and Perspectives, in THE LEGAL TREATMENT OF ISLAMIC
MINORITIES INEUROPE 1, 1-10 (Roberta Aluffi Beck-Peccoz & Giovanna Zincone eds.,
2004); Nikola Tietze, Muslims' Collective Self-Description as Reflected in the Institutional
Recognition of Islam: The Islamic Charta of the Central Council of Muslims in Germany and
Case Law in German Courts, in ISLAM AND MUSLIMS IN GERMANY 215, 230-32 (Ala AlHamarneh & J6rn Thielmann eds., 2008); Sami Zemi, Islam, European Identity and the
Limits of Multiculturalism, in RELIGIOUS FREEDOM AND THE NEUTRALITY OF THE STATE:
THE POSITION OF ISLAM INTHE EUROPEAN UNION 158, 158-72 (Wasif A. R. Shadid & P.
S. Van Koningsveld eds., 2002); U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, 2011 INTERNATIONAL RELIGIOUS

FREEDOM REPORT: ITALY, available at http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/
171701.pdf [hereinafter ITALY REPORT]; AndrAs Saj6, Preliminaries to a Concept of
ConstitutionalSecularism, 6 INT'LJ. CONST. L. 605, 614-16 (2008); Willy Fautre, Full Veil,

Burqa, Niqab, Hifab ...

A Challenge to 'European' Values, RELIGIOUS FREEDOM: NEW

EUROPE SPECIAL EDITION, http://neurope.eu/religiousfreedom/full-veil-burqa-niqab-

hijab...-a-challenge-to-'european'-values (last visited Sept. 10, 2012). In the German
context, see Gerdien Jonker, From 'Foreign Workers' to 'Sleepers: The Churches, the State
and Germany's 'Discovery' of Its Muslim Population, in EUROPEAN MUSLIMS AND THE
SECULAR STATE 113, 113-23 (Jocelyne Cesari & SeAn McLoughlin eds., 2005).
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legal actions have increasingly been used as corrective devices
utilized to adjust, contain, and engineer Islam-based practices.'
Cultural tensions over the growing presence of Islam
crystallized the controversies surrounding the female attire.
Islamic dress has not been uniformly regulated, and some
European countries refrained altogether from imposing legal
restrictions in this context. Among countries regulating this
practice, the range of policies depended on the type of attire
(headscarf, filbab, burqa, etc.), the public space (public sector
institutions, educational arenas, streets, etc.) and the person in
question (teachers, students, civil servants and so forth). Yet, a
conspicuous number of legal limitations on Islamic female attire
arose in recent decades rationalized as protecting fundamental
liberal values or as safeguards to an imagined, homogeneous
Christian-European identity. 6
One such prominent example is the 2004 French law
banning ostensible religious symbols or clothing in public
schools,7 whose primary aim was the outlawing of Islamic
headscarves.8 Legal deliberations began fifteen years earlier with
5. For a discussion of the German context, see Peter Frank, Welcoming Muslims into
the Nation: Tolerance, Politics and Integration in Germany, in MUSLIMS INTHE WEST AFTER
9/11: RELIGION, POLITICS, AND LAW 119, 122-26 (ocelyne Cesari ed., 2009).

6. See Valdrie Amiraux, The Headscarf Question: What is Really the Issue?, in
EUROPEAN ISLAM: CHALLENGES FOR SOCIETY AND PUBLIC POLICY, supra note 4, at 124,

139-43 (Samir Amghar et al. eds., 2007); Hans Michael Heinig, The Headscarfof a
Muslim Teacher in German Public Schools, in RELIGION IN THE PUBLIC SPHERE: A
COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF GERMAN, ISRAELI, AMERICAN AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 181,

186-87 (Winfried Brugger & Michael Karayanni eds., 2007); JOAN WALLACH SCOTT,
THE POLITICS OF THE VEIL 125-27 (2007); Oliver Gerstenberg, Germany: Freedom of
Conscience in Public Schools, 3 INT'LJ. CONST. L. 94, 96-97 (2005); Susanna Mancini, The
Power of Symbols and Symbols as Power Secularism and Religion as Guarantors of Cultural
Convergence,30 CARDOZO L. REv. 2629, 2643-44 (2009).
7. Loi 2004-228 du 15 mars 2004 encadrant, en application du principe de lalcitd,
le port de signes ou de tenues manifestant une appartenance religieuse dans les 4coles,
colleges et lycdes publics [Law 2004-228 of March 15, 2004 concerning, as an
application of the principle of the separation of church and state, the wearing of
symbols or garb which show religious affiliation in public primary and secondary
schools],JOURNAL OFFICIEL DE LA REPUBLIQUE FRANCAISE

U.O.]

[OFFICIAL GAZETTE OF

FRANCE], Mar. 17, 2004, p. 5190. The law was approved in the National Assembly by a
vote of 494 to 36, in the Senate by a vote of 276 to 20, and received the approval of the
President and the Prime Minister. See T. Jeremy Gunn, Religion and Law in France:
Secularism, Separation and State Intervention, 57 DRAKE L. REV. 949, 961 n.76 (2009).
8. JOHN R. BOWEN, WHY THE FRENCH DON'T LIKE HEADSCARVES 1 (2007)

("Although worded in a religion-neutral way, everyone understood the law to be aimed
at keeping Muslim girls from wearing headscarves in school."); SCOTT, supra note 6, at
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a governmental request to France's highest administrative
tribunal to advise on the legal compatibility of wearing religious
symbols and the principle of larcitd (secularism) in public
education following the expulsion of veiled Muslim girls from
public school.9 In its decision, the Conseil d'ttat laid out a vague
balancing formula on the permissibility of religious symbols in
public schools: 0
[P]upils wearing signs in schools by which they manifest
their affiliation to a particular religion is not in itself
incompatible with the principle of secularism in so far as it
constitutes the exercise of the freedom of expression and
manifestation of religious beliefs, but that this freedom
should not allow pupils to display signs of religious
affiliation, which, inherently, in the circumstances in which
they are worn, individually or collectively, or conspicuously
or as a means of protest, might constitute a form of
or propaganda,
pressure, provocation, proselytism
undermine the dignity or freedom of the pupil or other
members of the educational community, compromise their
health or safety, disrupt the conduct of teaching activities
and the educational role of the teachers, or, lastly, interfere
with order in the school or the normal functioning of the
public service."
It left the implementation of this formula to ministerial
circulars and school authorities, which resulted in a two-fold
impact.'2 First, its prescription of a case-by-case approach invited
1-2 ("The law . .. was aimed primarily at Muslim girls wearing headscarves .... The
other groups were included to undercut the charge of discrimination against Muslims
and to comply with a requirement that such laws apply universally.").
9. PUBLIC LAW 434-35 (Sweet & Maxwell, eds., 1990) ("The Minister of National
Education decided to ask three questions of the Conseil d'Etat- '(a) In view of
constitutional and statutory principles and the rules relating to public schools, is the
wearing of religious insignia compatible with the principle of secularity (laicit)? (b) If
so, what conditions may be applied to it by ministerial instruction, school rules and
decisions of heads of schools? (c) If the wearing of such insignia is banned, or if
conditions applied to it are not fulfilled, what steps are available ... and subject to what
sort of procedures and safeguards?'").
10. See generally NEVILLE BROWN & JOHN S. BELL, FRENCH ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
(5th ed. 1998) (describing the courts' functions in France).
11. See Dogru v. France, 49 Eur. H.R. Rep. 179 (2009), available at
(quoting the
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/search.aspx?i=001-90039
Conseil d'Etat, Case No. 346.893, of Nov. 27, 1989).
12. See Kathryn Boustead, The French HeadscarfLaw before the European Court of
Human Rights, 16J. TRANSNAT'L. L. &POL'Y 167, 188 (2007).

2012]

FUNCTION OF LA WIN CULTRUAL DEBATES

99

the continuation of the headscarf controversy.' 3 Second, it
steered political debate toward a legalistic course that ultimately
yielded a legislative ban.14 Conflicts over the Islamic headscarf in
schools continued in the following years, with the Conseil d'Etat
periodically called upon to arbiter exclusions of veiled Muslims
students in different localities.' 5 Applying its initial advisory
formula, the Conseil d'Atat invalidated the vast majority of
expulsions, finding schools' policies too general or excessive.' 6
Expulsions were upheld in situations where the headscarf was
deemed disruptive to educational activities or perilous to
student's safety (e.g., during physical education classes), which
were justified on grounds of disturbance to public order. 7
Yet, against this rights-centered jurisprudence, a political
consensus emerged connecting the Islamic headscarf to France's
contemporary social and political problems. 8 Public discourse
13. See PIERRE BIRNBAUM, THE IDEA OF FRANCE 231-33 (M. B. Debevoise trans.,
2001) (characterizing the decision as an "unsatisfactory state of affairs .. . since it is a
matter of opinion whether a symbol of religious conviction has an 'ostentatious
character.'"); see also DOMINIC MCGOLDRICK, HUMAN RIGHTS AND RELIGION: THE
ISLAMIC HEADSCARF DEBATE IN EUROPE 70 (2006); Elisa T. Beller, The HeadscarfAffair:

The Conseil d'tial on the Role of Religion and Culture in French Society, 39 TEXAS INT'L L.J.
581, 614-15, 618; Boustead, supranote 12, at 188-89; Mohammad Mazher Idriss, Larcid
and the Banning of the "Hifab" in France, 25 LEGAL STUD. 260, 273 (2005); Sebastian

Poulter, Muslims Headscarves in School: Contrasting Legal Approaches in England and
France,17 OXFORDJ. LEGAL STUD. 44, 59 (1997); Elaine R. Thomas, Competing Visions of

Citizenship and Integration in France's HeadscarfAffair 8(2)

J. EUR.

AREA STUD. 167, 167

(2000).

14. Claire de Galembert, L'affaire du foulard in the Shadow of the Strasbourg Court:
Article 9 and the Public Career of the Veil in France, in LEGAL PRACTICE AND CULTURAL
DIVERSITY 237, 237, 254-57 (Ralph Grillo et al. eds., 2009).
15. See BOWEN, supra note 8, at 92; AHMET T. KURU, SECULARIAM AND STATE
POLICIES TOWARD RELIGION: THE UNITED STATES, FRANCE, AND TURKEY 103-04 (2009);
Scorr, supra note 6, at 24-29; BRONWYN WINTER & SUSAN HAWTHORNE, HIjAB AND THE
REPUBLIC: UNCOVERING THE FRENCH HEADSCARF 163-267 (2008).

16. SeeJeremy Gunn, Religious Freedom and Laicid: A Comparison of the United States
and France, 2004 BYU L. REv. 419, 457 (noting a ratio of forty-one decisions out of fortynine reversing expulsions of veiled schoolgirls).
17. See id.; see also Beller, supra note 13, at 584; Idriss, supra note 13, at 273-75
(discussing the disparities in the Conseil's case law); MCGOLDRICK, supra note 13, at
70-73.
18. See generally BOWEN, supra note 8; OLIVER ROY, SECULARISM CONFRONTS ISLAM
(2007); SCOTT, supra note 6; Eva Brems, Above Children's Heads. The Headscarf

Controversy in European Schools from the Perspective of Children's Rights, 14 INT'LJ. CHILD.
RTS. 119, 120 (2006); T. Jeremy Gunn, Under God But Not the Scarf The FoundingMyths

of Religious Freedom in the United States and lalrcit in France,46J. CHURCH & ST. 7, 10-11
(2004). See also Elizabeth Sebian, Islam in France, EURO-ISLAM.INFO, http://www.euro-
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increasingly ignored the religious freedom dimension of the
veil, stressing instead its threat to fundamental French values
like gender equality, secularism, and national unity.19 Finally, a
commissioned governmental inquiry examined the application
of lafciti in the Republic, finding the headscarf no longer "a
question of freedom of conscience, but of public order."2o The
enactment of the ban on ostensible religious symbols then
followed as the implementation of (one of) the commission's
recommendations. 2'
Islamic attire in state schools came under legal
consideration in Germany as well. Controversy erupted in
relation to a teacher's headscarf when Fereshta Ludin, a public
school teacher, was denied employment for wearing the Islamic
Court
Constitutional
The
Federal
headscarf.22
as a
the case
(Bundesverfassungsgericht) approached
constitutional clash between (i) a civil servant's religious
freedom and (ii) the state's duty to provide and the right of
parents and students to receive education in a religiously neutral

islam.info/country-profiles/france (last visited Oct 11, 2012) (discussing developments
in the headscarf controversy, including integration challenges, socio-economic
segregation and gender-based concerns).
19. See BOWEN, supra note 8 at 102, 105-06 (discussing then-Prime Minister
Raffarin declaring in April 2003 that schools are the "premier space of the Republic"
and should be protected from "ostentatious signs of communalism," and then-Interior
Minister Nicolas Sarkozy's speech in April 2003 against identity card photos with
Islamic veils in line with "Republican law"); CHRISTIAN JOPPKE, VEIL: MIRROR OF
IDENTIlY 46 (2009) (discussing then-Interior Minister Sarkozy's April 2003
declaration); ROBERT O'BRIEN, THE STASI REPORT: THE REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE OF
REFLECTION ON THE APPLICATION OF THE PRINCIPLE OF SECULARIlY INTHE REPUBLIC 1
(2005) (translating then-Minister of Education Francois Bayrou's circulaire no. 1649 du
Septembre 1994 in connection with the headscarf instructing schools to ban "the
presence and the multiplication of symbols so ostentatious that their significance is
precisely to separate certain children from the rules of common life in the school");
Elaine Sciolino, Chirac Backs Law to Keep Signs of Faithout of Schools, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 18,
2003, at A17 (discussing then-President Jaques Chirac's speech from the Elysee Palace,
Dec. 17, 2003, calling for a legislative ban on religious symbols in the interest of
diversity in schools).
20. O'BRIEN, supra note 19, at 52-54.
21. JOPPKE, supra note 19, at 50 (noting 494 diputis in favor, 36 against, and 31
abstentions).
22. Bundesverfassungsgerichts [BVerfG] [Federal Constitutional Court] Sept 24,
2003, NEUE JURISTISCHE WOCHENSCHRIFT [NJW] 3581, 2004 (Ger.), available at
http://www.bundesverfassungsgerichLde/entscheidungen/rs20030924_2bvrl43602en.
html.
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environment.2 3 The Court observed that a religiously motivated
dress by a teacher carries "abstract dangers" to the school's
neutral environment, opening up "the possibility of influence
on the pupils and of conflicts with parents that .

..

may

endanger the carrying out of the school's duty to provide
education."24 The Court, however, also emphasized the lack of
confirmed knowledge about the negative effects a teacher's
Islamic headscarf had on students. 25 Absent sufficient statutory
basis in the Baden-Wirttemberg's Civil Service Act under
consideration, the majority opinion (reflecting five of eight
judges) refrained from restricting headscarves in schools. At the
same time, the Court stipulated that each kinder is at liberty to
decide on such statutory restrictions according to its own
particularities and religious compositions.26 In stark departure
from its mediating role in the context of abortion,27 the German
Court not only invited a "permissive" trajectory for legislative
bans,28 but effectively crafted it by creating a "legal vacuum" on
religious symbols that necessitated an immediate legislative
response.29 This legislative response soon followed in the form
of eight (of sixteen) linderbans on headscarves. Of these eight,
two applied the ban to all civil servants and seven exempted
Christian andJewish symbols. 0
The first decade of the new millennium closed with
growing tensions throughout Europe over the more traditional
23. Id. 1 45-47.
24. Id. 49. For an analysis of the case, see Christine Langenfeld & Sarah
Mohsen, Germany: The Teacher HeadscarfCase, 3 INT'LJ. CONsT. L. 86, 86-90 (2005) and
Gerstenberg, supra note 6, at 94-97.
25. NJW 3581 (Ger.), 1 56.
26. Id. It 47, 62.
27. See infra Part III.
28. MCGOLDRICK, supra note 13, at 118.
29. JOPPKE, supra note 19, at 70; see alsoAxel Frhr von Campenhausen, The German
HeadscarfDebate, 2004 BYU L. REV. 665, 682 (2004).
30. See Heinig, supra note 6, at 194. Legal restrictions on headscarves have been
imposed by the following states: Baden-Warttemberg, Bavaria, Bremen, Lower Saxony,
North-Rhine Westphalia, and Saarland enacted headscarf bans for teachers in public
schools, while Berlin and Hesse enacted headscarf bans for all civil servants. See BUREAU
OF DEMOCRACY, U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, 2009 INTERNATIONAL RELIGIOUS FREEDOM
REPORT: GERMANY (2009), available at http://www.state.gov/j/drl/rls/irf/2009/
127312.htm. With the exception of Berlin, all bans included exemptions for Christian
and Jewish symbols. JOPPKE, supra note 19, at 71-78. For an analysis of the specific laws,
see David W. Hendon &Jeremiah Russell, Notes on Church-StateAffairs, 47 J. CHURCH &
STATE 189, 191 (2005).
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Islamic veil, even though the number of Muslim females fully
covering their face and bodies has been negligible and does not
seem to be rapidly growing)" This underlies a stark
disproportionality between the intensity of public attitudes and
the actuality of the problem. France became the first European
nation to ban full-face covering in public with an overwhelming
approval of both houses of parliament.32 This prohibition was
broader than the earlier ban on headscarves in that it applies to
public locations and spaces in general and to all people
irrespective of gender, age, or nationality (including visitors).3
Despite an earlier Conseil d'Etat advisory opinion that a ban
stands in violation of France's national and international legal
obligations,34 the law has nevertheless been cleared during the
legislative process by the Conseil Constitutionnel,France's highest
constitutional authority.35 The Conseil Constitutionnel approved
the legislature's rationale prohibiting "practices that are
dangerous for public safety and security and fail to comply with
the minimum requirements of life in society . . . women who

conceal their face, voluntarily or otherwise, are placed in a
situation of exclusion and inferiority patently incompatible with
constitutional principles of liberty and equality."3 6 Conveying a
31. See Burqa Ban Blights Belgium, Say Critics, EURONEWS (Apr. 30, 2010),
http://www.euronews.net/2010/04/30/burqa-ban-blights-belgium-say-critics;

Amanda

Knief, Libert4 Egalit6-de Fdministes!Revealing the Burqa as a Pro-Choice Issue, HUMANIST
Sept.-Oct. 2010, available at http://www.thehumanist.org/september-october-2010/
liberte-egalite%E2%80%94de-feministes-revealing-the-burqa-as-a-prochoice-issue; John
Lichfield & Vanessa Mock, Burqa Banned in Belgium, NEW ZEALAND HERALD (May 1,
2010),
10642088.

http://www.nzherald.co.nz/world/news/article.cfm?c-id=2&objectid=

2010),
(Sept. 14,
32. French Senate Approves Burqa Ban, CNN
http://articles.cnn.com/2010)9-14/world/france.burqa.ban_1_burqa-overt-religioussymbols-ban-last-year?_.s=PM:WORLD.
33. Robert E. Snyder, Liberti Religieuse en Europe: Discussing the French Concealment
Act, 18 HUM. RTs. BRIEF 3, 14, 15 (2011).
34. CONSEIL D'ETAT, STUDY OF POSSIBLE LEGAL GROUNDS FOR BANNING THE FULL
VEIL (2010), available at http://www.aihja.org/images/users/l/files/fullveil.en.pdf?
PHPSESSID=f83dg63dqj6lvokoep4kk44ful.
35. Conseil constitutionnel [CC] [Constitutional Court] decision No. 2010613DC, Oct. 7, 2010, Rec. 276 (Fr.), translation available at http://www.conseilconstitutionnel.fr/conseil-constitutionnel/root/bank/download/2010-613DC-en2Ol0
613dc.pdf. The ruling did incorporate one change-exempting "places of worship
open to the public" as contravening Article 10 of the Declaration of the Rights of Man
and the Citizen of 1789. Id. 1 5.
36. Id. 4.
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reasonable and proportionate balance "between safeguarding
public order and guaranteeing constitutionally protected
rights," the law was construed constitutional.37 Accordingly, the
public and political "values-based condemnation of practices
that some Muslim women undertake on the basis of their
religious convictions" became legal justifications."
In Belgium, where hijab-based controversies were generally
handled on a case-by-case basis, 9 a ban on full-face coverings
took effect in July 2011 after it was overwhelmingly approved by
the two houses of parliament. 40 Carrying a monetary penalty and
the threat of jail time, the law forbade face coverings in public
for security reasons. 4 ' The legislation of a burqa-type ban is
currently being deliberated in the Netherlands and Italy, where
public order legislation has already been applied against burqawearing women in some municipalities. 42
The traditional version of the Islamic dress came under
judicial consideration in the school context by the English
House of Lords, which upheld a public school's suspension of its
jilbab-wearing student, Shabina Begum. 4 The ruling is a telling

37. Id. 1 5.
38. John R Bowen, How the French State Justifies Controlling Muslim Bodies: From
Harm-basedto Values-based Reasoning, 78 SOC. RES. 325, 328 (2011).
39. Hassan Bousetta & Dirk Jacobs, Multiculturalism, Citizenship and Islam in
ProblematicEncounters in Belgium, in MULTICULTURALISM, MUSLIMS AND CITIZENSHIP 23,

30-31 (Tariq Modood et al. eds., 2006); Dominic McGoldrick, Muslim Veiling
Controversies in Europe, in I YEARBOOK OF MUSLIMS IN EUROPE 427, 454 (Jorgen S.
Nielsen et al. eds., 2009).
40. Vanessa Mock, Burqa Ban Unites a PoliticallyDivided Belgium, DEUTSCHE WELLE
Uuly 23, 2011), http://www.dw.de/dw/article/0,,15260969,00.htnl; Overwhelming
Majority in Belgian Parliament Votes Symbolic Burqa Ban, BBC MONITORING EUROPE, May
2, 2011, available at http://www.accessmylibrary.com/article-IG1-255234211/
overwhelming-majority-belgian-parliament.html. The ban on the full face Islamic veil
has been considered by Austria, the Netherlands, several cantons in Switzerland, and is
currently under deliberations in Italy. The cities of Lleida and Barcelona in Spain have
also enacted specific bans. Herman Salton, Fear Factor: Europe Bans the Burqa, OPEN
DEMOCRACY (Nov. 8, 2010), http://www.opendemocracy.net/herman-salton/fearfactor-europe-bans-burqa.
41. Mock, supra note 40.
42. Katerina Nikolas, Netherlands to Ban the Burqa in 2013, DIGITALJOURNAL Uan.
30, 2012), http://www.digitaljournal.com/article/318703.
43. R. (Shabina Begum) v. Headteacher and Governors of Denbigh High School,
[2006] UKHL 15, [2006] ALL ER 487, [2006] ELR 273 (H.L.) (appeal taken from
Eng.); see also Gareth Davis, The House of Lords and Religious Clothing in Begum v.
Headteacher and Governors of Denbigh High School, 13 EUR. PUB. L. 423, 423-27
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example of courts' active roles in constructing limits and
expectations of Islamic manifestations in the public sphere. To
harmonize its religiously diverse student body, the school
designated the shalwar kameez, a traditional South and CentralAsian dress, as its dress-code option for Muslim students." The
school refused Begum's wish to wear the more traditional jilbab
out of concern that this would pressure other students and
threaten social cohesion."5 Notwithstanding the incorporation of
the European Convention on Human Rights ("ECHR") into
English law via the Human Rights Act ("HRA"),46 the House of
Lords unanimously affirmed Begum's exclusion, with three
justices finding no interference with Begum's rights and two
finding the interference justified.47 Anxiety over radical Islam
manifested by the filbab is evident in the ruling's narrative,
depicting sheer praise of the school's inclusive conduct and
disapproval toward the confrontational and uncompromising
attitudes of the Begums.4 Lord Scott found it "extraordinary"
that the shalwar kameez would not be regarded modest enough
for Muslim girls. 49 Lord Hoffman, while acknowledging that it
would be "irrelevant" to assess how obligatory is the jilbab in
Islam, still expected "common civility" in religious conduct. 1
Finally, echoing the prevailing French approach, Baroness Hale
(2007); SAMANTHA KNIGHTS, FREEDOM OF RELIGION, MINORITIES, AND THE LAw 48
(2007).
44. (2006] UKHL 15, 1 6 (discussing dress codes at the school).
45. [2006] UKHL 15,1 18 (discussing the threat to social cohesion).
46. European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental
Freedoms, November 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 221, [hereinafter ECHR], available at
Article 9 of the ECHR
http;//www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/3ae6b3b04.html.
prescribes: "(1) Everyone has the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion;
this right includes freedom to change his religion or belief, and freedom, either alone
or in community with others and in public or private, to manifest his religion or belief,
in worship, teaching, practice and observance. (2) Freedom to manifest one's religion
or beliefs shall be subject only to such limitations as are prescribed by law and are
necessary in a democratic society in the interests of public safety, for the protection of
public order, health or morals, or the protection of the rights and freedoms of others."
I art. 9. The ECHR was incorporated into English Law by the Human Rights Act
("HRA") of 1998. See Human Rights Act, 1998, c. 42 (Eng.).
47. [2006] UKHL 15, 1t 25, 41, 55, 72, 94 (noting that Lords Bingham, Hoffman
and Scott found no interference in Begum's right to religious freedom, while Lord
Nicholls and Baroness Hale found the interference justified).
48. IM 11 25, 34, 44, 46, 50, 52,77, 80, 83,98.
49. Md. 83.
50. MId 50.
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focused on the transformative duties of public education and
the protection of gender equality.5 ' Hence, Islam can be fitting
for the educational public sphere as long as it can find
expression under the religiously neutral shalwar kameez.
Anything more extensive is a slippery slope for social cohesion
and endangers the liberal mission of schools.
Established to oversee the implementation of ECHR, the
European Court of Human Rights ("ECtHR") systematically
deferred to national policies and the expertise of domestic
courts in cases concerning the Islamic headscarf.52 In its leading
ruling, Leyla Sahin v. Turkey,53 the ECtHR relied on the margin
of appreciation doctrine and endorsed Turkey's position
legitimizing the prohibition on the headscarf as a threat to
secularism and democratic values.54 A similar rationale guided
the ECtHR in finding "not unreasonable" the expulsions of
Muslim French students wearing Islamic headscarves during
sports classes in light of domestic criteria on health, safety and
assiduity.55 A veiled-teacher's dismissal was upheld in Dahlab v.
Switzerland.56 The ECtHR found the infringement on religious
freedom justified since it was "difficult to reconcile the wearing
of an Islamic headscarf with the message of tolerance, respect
for others and, above all, equality and non-discrimination that
all teachers in a democratic society must convey to their
pupils."57

The educational arena furnished additional assimilationist
legal measures against Muslims. Judicial proceedings from
Germany and Switzerland exemplified how earlier religionbased exemptions from mandatory physical education classes
have increasingly been replaced with denials of such exemptions
on the basis of public interests. In Germany, lower courts have
51. Id. 1 95, 96, 97.
52. See Isabelle Rorive, Religious Symbols in the Public Space: In Search of a European
Answer, 30 CARDOZO L. REv. 2669, 2285-86 (2009) (analyzing European Court of
Human Rights ("ECtHR") jurisprudence on the headscarf).
53. Sahin v. Turkey, 2005-XI Eur. Ct. H.R. 117.
54. Id. 1 39, 114.
55. Dogru v. France, 49 Eur. H.R. Rep. 179 (2009); Kervanci v. France, App. no.
31645/04, 1 73, Eur. Ct. H.R. (2008), available at http://cmiskp.echr.coe.int/tkpl97/
search.asp?skin=hudoc-en.
56. Dahlab v. Switzerland, 2001-V Eur. Ct. H.R. 430.
57. Id. at 463.
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been narrowing a 1990s German Federal Administrative ruling,58
finding physical education to outweigh the potential
infringement on religious freedom.59 In Switzerland, a similar
shift has taken place within the jurisprudence of the Federal
Supreme Court.6 o Whereas in 1993 the Court exempted a minor
female Muslim from mandatory swimming lessons on the basis
of her religious faith, 6 ' the Court overruled its own judgment in
2008 in relation to two minor Muslim males.62 Framing the latter
case "as an issue of immigration, and consequently, of
integration of migrants rather than one of religion per se,"63 the
Court construed public interests realized through swimming
classes, (i.e., personal safety, equal opportunity and cultural
integration) as overriding individual religious freedom. 64
The treatment of halal slaughtering in Germany further
substantiates how a growing popular resistance to the visibility of
Islam has been manifested in restrictive legal limitations.
European treatment of religious slaughtering does not follow a
single model, with most countries traditionally offering a
religious exemption from slaughter regulations as several others
prohibited altogether slaughter deviating from state rules (e.g.,
prior electric shock).65 Executive and judicial resistance toward
protecting the Islamic ritual of halal slaughtering has been
evident in different landers since the 1970s, interlocked with a
growing concern for animal rights. 66 The 1986 Federal Animal
58. BverwG 25 Aug. 1993, BverwGE 94, 82 (Ger.) (exempting a twelve year old
Muslim school girl from mixed physical education classes).
59. OVG North Rhine-Westphalia 5 Sep. 2007, Nordrhein-Westfalische
Venoaltungsblatter 22 (2008) (Ger.): 154; VG Dusseldorf 30 May 2005, NordrheinWestfalische Verwaltungsbldtter 20 (Ger.); VG Dusseldorf 18 K 301/08 of 7 May 2008
(Ger.); VG Dusseldorf Au 3 E 08.1613 of 17 Dec. 2008 (Ger.).
60. Johannes Reich, Switzerland: Freedom of Creed and Conscience, Immigration and
Public Schools in the Postsecular State-Compulsory Educational Swimming Instruction
Revisited, 7 INT'LJ. CONsT. L. 754, 761 (2009).
61. Bundesgericht [BGer] [Federal Supreme Court] June 18, 1993, 119 BGE Ia
178 (Switz.).
62. Budesgericht [BGer] [Federal Supreme Court] Oct. 24, 2008, 135 BGE 1 79
(Switz.).
63. Reich, supranote 60, at 762.
64. Id. at 762-63.
65. See Pablo Lerner & Alfredo M. Rabello, The Prohibition of Ritual Slaughteiing
(Kosher Shechita and Halal)and Freedom of Religion of Minorities,22J. L. & RELIGION 1, 1215 (2007).
66. See SiLVIO FERRARI & ROSSELLA BOTrONI, LEGISLATION REGARDING RELIGIOUS
SLAUGHTER IN EU MEMBER, CANDIDATE AND ASSOCIATED COUNTRIES 5-6, 88 (2010),
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Protection Act (Tierschutzgesetz) prohibited the slaughter of
animals without previous stunning in the interest of sparing
avoidable pain. 67 Because this prohibition negated methods of
religious slaughter, the law granted an "exceptional permission
for slaughter without stunning" when "necessary to meet the
needs of members of certain religious communities . . . whose

mandatory rules required slaughter without stunning." 68
Yet, between the late 1980s into the mid-1990s, a series of
court rulings denied constitutional protection to halal
slaughtering on the following grounds: 69 (i) halal slaughtering
was distinguished from the protected Jewish practice interpreted
as a mandatory ritual only for the Jewish community, (ii) Islam
in Germany was construed to be practiced differently than the
same religion practiced elsewhere, with halal slaughtering
mandated (or not) only by non-German Islam, and (iii) Because
Islam has yet to be recognized as a corporation of public law
(Khirperschafi des dffentlichen Rechts) both at the federal and the

kinder level, halal slaughtering was not afforded constitutional
protection.
The Federal Constitutional Court reversed these judicial
rationales in 2002.70 Recognizing halal slaughtering as a
fundamental right of Muslims, the Court concluded that it
surpassed animal protection construed as "a public interest [of]

available at http://www.issuu.com/florencebergeaud-blackler/docs/report-legislation;
Shai Lavi, Unequal Rites-Jews, Muslims, and the History of Ritual Slaughter in Germany, in
JUDEN AND MUSLIME IN DEUTSCHLAND: RECHT, RELIGION, IDENTITAT 164, 175 (Jos6
Brunner & Shai Lavi eds., 2009).
67. Tierschutzgesetz [Animal Protection Act], Aug. 12, 1986, Bundesgesetzblatt
[BGBI.] I S. 1277 at § 4a.1, translated in FERRARI & BoTIONI, supra note 66, at 88. See
Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfG] [Federal Constitutional Court] Jan. 15, 2002, 1
BvR 1783/99 (Ger.), available at http://www.bundesverfassungsgericht.de/en/
decisions/rs20020115_lbvrl78399en.html.
68. Tierschutzgesetz [Animal Protection Act], Aug. 12, 1986, BGBI. I S. 1277, at
§ 4a.2.
69. Bundesverwaltungsgericht [BVerwG] [Federal Administrative Court] June 15,
1995, BVerwGE 99, 1; Verwaltungsgericht [VG] [Administrative Trial Court] Koblenz
1993 [AZ: 2 K 1874/92.KG]; Oberverwaltungsgericht [OVG] [Higher Administrative
Court] 1993 [Az: 20A 3287/92]; Verwaltungsgericht Gelsenkirchen 1992b [AZ: 7 K
5738/91]. See also Lavi, supra note 66, at 175-77; MATHIAS ROHE, THE LEGAL
TREATMENT OF MUSLIMS IN GERMANY 7 (2003).

70. Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfG] [Federal Constitutional Court] Jan. 15,
2002, 1 BvR 1783/99 (Ger.).
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high importance among the population.""7 The ruling
...
generated a speedy legislative backlash in the form of a
constitutional amendment "directed against the Muslim ritual,"
elevating animal protection to a "national objective" in the
German Constitution.72 Bestowed with its invigorated
constitutional status, animal welfare now enjoys equal weight
when balanced against other fundamental rights including
religious freedom, which opened a new legal avenue for
reluctant courts and administrative authorities to restrict halal
slaughtering in Germany.7 3
With migration emerging as a central component in
contemporary European identity politics, immigration laws have
also taken a restrictive turn justified as furthering liberal ends.74
The Netherlands seemed to have experienced the most
dramatic policy reorientation. 7 Successive legislation replaced
the once celebratory example of multicultural tolerance with a
comprehensive mandatory civic integration program designed
predominantly for the "non-western" migrant population.76 This
program includes: (i) pre-arrival "civic integration" exam at the
country of origin for people seeking residency, (ii) compulsory
testing of language proficiency and knowledge of Dutch values,
71. Id. 1 41 (emphasis added).
72. See Lavi, supra note 66, at 178. The Bundestag voted overwhelmingly (549 to
19) in 2002 to add "and the animals" ("und die Tiere) to Article 20a of the German
constitution. Kate M. Nattrass, ". . . Und die Tiere": ConstitutionalProtectionfor Germany's
Animals, 10 ANIMAL L. 283, 302 (2004) (discussing the politics preceding the
amendment).
73. Case law remains divergent. Compare Verwaltungsgericht [VG] [administrative
trial court] AU 5 E 03.2198, with Oberverwaltungsgericht [OVG] [higher administrative
court] 4 M B 4/04. See also FERRARI & BOTTONI, supra note 66, at 21; Lavi, supra note
66, at 178.
74. See generallyJEFHUYSMANS, THE POLITICS OF INSECURITY: FEAR MIGRATION AND
ASYLUM IN THE EU 72-77 (2006); CHRISTIAN JOPPKE, CITIZENSHIP AND IMMIGRATION

31-32 (2010) [hereinafter JOPPKE, CITIZENSHIP]; Thomas Diez & Vicki Squire,
Traditions of Citizenship and the Securitization of Migration in Germany and Britain, 12
CITIZENSHIP STUD. 565 (2008); Liav Orgad, "Cultural Defense" of Nations: Cultural
Citizenship in France, Germany and the Netherlands, 15(6) EUR. L.J. 719, 723-29 (2009);
Allen Stoddard, Immigration and Islam in Europe, EURO-ISLAM.INFO, http://www.euroislam.info/key-issues/immigration (last visited Oct. 27, 2011).
75. Triadafilos Triadafilopoulos, Illiberal Means to Liberal Ends? Understanding
Recent ImmigrantIntegration Policies in Europe, 37J. ETHNIC & MIGRATION STUD. 861, 868
(2011).
76. See J. F. I. KLAVER & A. W. M. ODe, CIVIC INTEGRATION AND MODERN
CITIZENSHIP 59-110 (2009) (discussing the recent changes in the Netherlands' law).
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institutions and social norms for new and settled immigrants,
(iii) an unpublished naturalization exam; (iv) income level
requirements and various fees, and (v) a given time frame and
limited number of chances to complete the integration
process.77
Perhaps the most striking judicial example for this
hardening shift toward Muslim immigration was the decision by
France's Conseil ditat to deny citizenship on the basis of
traditionalist Islamic lifestyle.78 Prior to the existing ban, the
Conseil d'tatupheld in 2008 the denial of citizenship to a niqabwearing Muslim on the grounds of failure to assimilate.'
Interpreting a 2003 clause in the Civil Code authorizing the
refusal of citizenship on the basis of "insufficient assimilation,
other than linguistic," the Conseil dttat ruled that a Moroccanborn woman who started wearing a niqab at the request of her
husband after moving to France was insufficiently assimilated.80
Acknowledging that the woman spoke French, was married to a
Frenchman of Moroccan origin, and mothered three French
children, the Conseil d'tat nevertheless concluded that the
woman adopted "a radical practice of her religion incompatible
with the essential values of the French community, especially the
principle of equality of sexes."81 In recent years, France's
immigration laws have also tightened through legislative
measures.82
Finally, with the growing presence of Islam across Western
Europe, the construction of Islamic places of worship has "led to
more and more frequents disputes, debates, conflicts and
posturing, even in countries where such conflicts were
77. Vera Marinelli, Current Immigration Debates in Europe: A Publication of the
European Migration Dialogue: The Netherlands 5-8 (Jan Niessen, Yongmi Schibel, &
Cressida Thompson eds., 2005), available at http://www.migpolgroup.com/public/
docs/141.EMDNetherlands_2005.pdf;
HUM. RTS. WATCH, THE NETHERLANDS:
DISCRIMINATION
IN THE
NAME
OF INTEGRATION
(2008),
available at
http://www.hrw.org/en/node/82373.
78. Conseil d'Etat [CE] [Council of State], June 27, 2008, MmeFaiza M., req. no.
available at http://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/affichJuriAdmin.do?idTexte=
286798,
CETATEXT000019081211.

79. See id.
80. See id.
81. See id.
82. See MARTIN SCHAIN, THE POLITICS OF IMMIGRATION IN FRANCE, BRITAIN, AND
THE UNITED STATES 57 (2008).
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previously unknown and mosques were already present.""8 While
disputes have frequently been resolved through municipal
negotiations or judicial remedies, examples of bureaucratic
denials to building mosques remain a recurrent issue most
notably in Italy.84 Minarets, the par excellence symbol of Islam's
penetration into the European public sphere, became a central
focus of such disputes.m Whereas Muslims often perceive the
construction of minarets as a "question of nostalgia, of doing
things as they would 'at home' . . . for non-Muslim residents, it

is often a matter of being invaded, almost as if a foreign body
had been forced upon them."86
In Switzerland, the legal manifestation of this growing
distrust recently played out in the form of direct democracy.8 7 A
local legal dispute in the municipality of Wangen bei Olten over
the construction of a minaret ignited a successful popular
initiative resulting in a constitutional amendment incorporating
a ban on the construction of minarets.8 8 A leading right wing
activist behind the successful initiative explained
[W]e don't want minarets. The minaret is a symbol of
political and aggressive Islam .

. .

. The minute you have

minarets in Europe it means Islam will have taken over
....

Banning minarets would send a clear signal that our

European laws, our Swiss laws, have to be accepted. And if
you want to live here, you must accept them. If you don't,
then go back."89

83. STEFANO ALLIEVI, CONFLICTS OVER MOSQUES IN EUROPE: POLICY ISSUES AND
TRENDS 7 (2009).
84. See ITALY REPORT, supra note 4. These denials "take the form of 'selective
enforcement' of rules that already exist but which are only highlighted when dealing
with mosques and Muslims." ALLIEVI, supra note 83, at 67.
85. ALLIEVI, supra note 83, at 45.
86. Id. at 46.
87. See id. at 47 (noting that anti-minaret legislation was also passed earlier in
Austria).
88. See Bundesverfassung [BV] [Constituntion] Apr. 18, 1999, art. 72 (Switz.)
("[T]he construction of minarets will be forbidden."); Joanna Pfaff-Czamecka,
Accommodating Religious Diversity in Switzerland, in INTERNATIONAL MIGRATION AND THE
GOVERNANCE OF RELIGIOUS DIVERSITY 223, 243-44 (Paul Bramadat & Matthias Koenig

eds., 2009).
89. Cultural Cleansing?, 62 EUROPEAN RACE BULLETIN 15 (2008), available at
http://www.irr.org.uk/pdf/ERIL.62.pdf (quoting Oskar Freysinger, Member of
Parliament, the Swiss People's Party (SVP)).
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Accordingly, direct democracy provided a majority of the Swiss
citizenry a legal venue to ban the construction of minarets
against the position of the Federal Supreme Court, the Federal
Council, and both chambers of parliament, which viewed the
proposed ban as violating the Swiss Constitution and
Switzerland's international obligations.9 Four minarets currently
exist throughout Switzerland, highlighting the depth of antiMuslim sentiments shared across Switzerland.91
Hence, a contentious political era over Islamic visibility and
access to the European public sphere yielded a sizable body of
legal measures institutionalizing exclusionary policies disguised
in liberal narratives. The compatibility of these developments
with liberal policy-making seems questionable considering that
the liberal project largely assumed to be fostering "greater
inclusion, openness, and pluralism."92 Moreover, according to
liberal constitutionalists, the legal process is a key component in
ends, since constitutional structures
realizing liberal
institutionalize protection for minorities in addressing cultural
conflicts.95 Obviously, no liberal society fully realizes a
commitment to neutrality.94 Yet, the discrepancy between liberal
ideals of pluralism and the assimilationist thrust reflected in
legal measures pertaining to Islamic practices seem to be

90. See The Swiss Referendum on Minarets: Background and Aftermath, EUROPEAN
RACE AUDIT BRIEFING PAPER 1, Feb. 2010, available at http://www.irr.org.uk/pdf2/
ERA BriefingPaperl.pdf (noting that 57.5% of the electorate voted in favor in a
roughly 54% turn out); Lorenz Langer, Panacea or Pathetic Fallacy?: The Swiss Ban on
Minarets, 43 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L. L. 863, 866 (2010). The ban has been challenged in

the ECtHR. See Whitney Hayes, Swiss Ban on Minarets Heads to European Court, THE
HUMAN RIGHTS BRIEF Uan. 28, 2010), http://hrbrief.org/2010/01/swiss-ban-onminarets-heads-to-european-court-2.
91. See U.S. DEP'T. OF STATE, 2010 RELIGIOUS FREEDOM REPORT: SWITZERLAND
(Nov. 17, 2010), http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/irf/2010/148989.htm (noting that
minarets are part of the mosques in Geneva, Zurich, Winterthur, and Wangen).

92. Fiona B. Adamson et al., The Limits of the Liberal State: Migration, Identity, and
Belonging,37J. ETHNIC & MIGRATION STUD. 843, 843 (2011).
93. RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 147-49 (1977); WALTER F.
MURPHY, CONSTITUTIONAL DEMOCRACY: CREATING AND MAINTAINING AJUST POLITICAL
ORDER 6-10 (2007); EDWARD SCHEIER, CRAFTING CONSTITUTIONAL DEMOCRACIES: THE
POLITICS OF INSTITUTIONAL DESIGN 3-4, 73-75 (2006); CASS R. SUNSTEIN, DESIGNING
DEMOCRACY: WHAT CONSTITUTIONS DO 6-7 (2007).

94. Stephen Holmes, The PermanentStructure of Antiliberal Thought, in LIBERALISM
AND THE MORAL LIFE 227, 230, 245 (Nancy L. Rosenblum ed., 1989).
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conspicuously stark, calling for closer scrutiny of these measures
as part of Europe's integration debate.95
II. ABORTION REFORMS ACROSS WESTERN EUROPE
Between the late 1960s to the late 1980s, bitter abortion
debates submerged the Western European public sphere. With a
growing social recognition of the health risks in clandestine
abortions and greater openness toward sexuality and gender
equality, Western European countries were compelled to
reevaluate their restrictive regulatory regimes on abortion. As
demonstrated in what follows, these reforms were preceded by
bitter public debates along liberal and conservative lines, which
ultimately resulted in uneasy legislative compromises over
contested ideas about the rights of women and the unborn.
However, these legislative compromises, which intentionally
avoided the pro-life and pro-choice dichotomy, proved resilient
in disarming European abortion politics.
Abortion debates in Britain emerged in the 1960s largely in
connection to public health concerns.96 Deadly backstreet
abortions and the births of many children with disabilities
caused by a drug taken during pregnancy (thalidomide)
generated public support for reforming the criminalization of
abortion induction.97 Reflecting these health concerns, the
Abortion Act 1967 allocated the decision making authority on
abortion solely to the medical system.98 Section 1(1) of the
95. See generally Ofrit Liviatan, Faith in the Law-The Role of Legal Arrangements in
Religion-Based Conflicts Involving Minorities, 34 B.C. INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 53 (2011)
[hereinafter Liviatan, Faithin the Law].
96. Stephen Brooke, Abortion Law Reform: 1929-1968, in THE ABORTION ACT 1967
15, 16 (Michael D. Kandiah & Gillian Staerck eds., 2001); COLIN FRANCOME, ABORTION

IN THE USA AND THE UK 53 (2004); EMILYJACKSON, REGULATING REPRODUCTION: LAW,
TECHNOLOGY AND AUTONOMY 77 (2001); Madeleine Simms, Britain, in ABORTION IN
THE NEW EUROPE: A COMPARATIVE HANDBOOK, supranote 96, at 31, 34.

97. On the process of reforming, see Offences Against the Person Act, 1861, 24 &
25 Vict., c. 100, § 58 (U.K.) and Infant Life (Preservation) Act 1929, 19 & 20 Geo 5, c.
34, §. 1(1) (U.K.). See BERNARD M. DICKENS, ABORTION AND THE LAw 49-50, 77 (1966);
JOHN KEOWN, ABORTION, DOCTORS AND THE LAw 84-109 (1988).

98. [U.K.] Abortion Act, 1967 C. 87. The Act was amended once in 1990 through
Section 37 of the Human Fertilization and Embryology Act to reduce legal abortions
from twenty-eight to twenty-four week gestation as a result of medical advancements in
technology related to pregnancies. See Simms, supra note 96, at 40; see also MELANIE
LATHAM, REGULATING REPRODUCTION: A CENTURY OF CONFLICT IN BRITAIN AND

FRANCE 89 (2002); Ellie Lee, Reinventing Abortion as a Social Problem: "Postabortion
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Abortion Act, titled "Medical Termination of Pregnancy,"
created a series of statutory defenses for medical professionals
performing abortions, refraining altogether from rights
discourse or the assignment of moral weight either to the
women's choice or the fetus's life.99
This trajectory proved a decisive determinant in calming
British abortion politics and generating parliamentary support
for the reform. 00 "Framing the law in "'medicalized"' terms
meant that medical authority, rather than moral imperative,
becomes decisive ... [and] marginalize [d] the opinion of those
who disagree with the existing abortion law on rights-based
grounds."' 0' Pro-lifers found solace in the fact that a woman's
decision to abort is monitored by the medical profession
inherently committed to preserving life.102 For pro-choicers this
legal compromise offered a viable expansion of abortion
possibilities, since bestowing doctors with medical discretion has
not limited access to abortion in Britain. 0 Moreover,
"medicalizing" the procedure also meant that abortion
procedures became a standard gynecological service offered in
public hospitals rather than private clinics, limiting the

Syndrome" in the United States and Britain, in How CLAIMS SPREAD: CROSS-NATIONAL

DIFFUSION OF SOCIAL PROBLEMS 39, 42 Uoel Best ed., 2001).
99. [U.K.] Abortion Act, 1967 C. 87, § 1 The Article reads: "Subject to the
provisions of this section, a person shall not be guilty of an offence under the law
relating to abortion when a pregnancy is terminated by a registered medical
practitioner if that practitioner and another registered medical practitioner are of the
opinion, formed in good faith . . . that the case in question meets several conditions,
including a pregnancy less than twenty-four weeks, and its continuance involves a
physical or mental risk for the woman, the fetus or her existing children, greater than if
the pregnancy were terminated." Id.
100. JACKSON, supra note 96, at 110.
101. Lee, supra note 98, at 4&-44.
102. JACKSON, supra note 96, at 83.
103. Ann Furedi & David Nolan, Fighting a Battle of Ideas-Conflict on Abortion in the
UK, in PLANNED PARENTHOOD IN EUROPE 7-11 (Nov. 1995); Lee, supra note 98, at 43;

Parliament, Pressure Groups, Networks and the Women's Movement: The Politics of Abortion
Law Reform in Britain (1967-83), in THE NEW POLITICS OF ABORTION 231-56 (Joni
Lovenduski &Joyce Outshoorn eds., 1986); see alsojoanna N. Erdmann, Moral Authority
in English and American Abortion Law, in CONSTITUTING EQUALITY: GENDER EQUALIlY
AND COMPARATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, supra note 130, at 107, 122-23; JACKSON,
supra note 96, at 81; SALLY SHELDON, BEYOND CONTROL: MEDICAL POWER AND
ABORTION LAw 163-64 (1997) (providing a feminist critique).
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possibility (and mobilizing potential) of protest against abortion
clinics. 0 4
Since the passage of the Abortion Act, abortion has
remained in the margins of British politics. Private bills to
amend this legal arrangement on abortion have been
introduced over the years but were all defeated, and "many
scholars note with relief that abortion in the United Kingdom
generates less conflict and controversy than in the United
States." 05 Similarly, attempts to challenge the Abortion Act in
courts met a reluctant judiciary. Rejecting the claim of a
husband seeking to stop his wife from terminating her
pregnancy, the British court remarked, "[i]t would be quite
impossible for the courts . . . to supervise the operation of the

Abortion Act 1967. The great social responsibility is firmly
placed by the law on the shoulders of the medical profession . .
. [only] a foolish judge . . . would seek to [interfere with the
discretion of doctors acting under the 1967 Act]." 0 6
The enactment of the HRA presented an opportunity to
shift abortion discourse in Britain in the direction of rightsbased claims.0 7 Yet, this scenario has been unconditionally
rebuffed by the judiciary. 08 Dismissing a claim for parental
notifications of a minor's abortion on the basis of parental right
to family life, the Court forcefully rejected the applicability of
American rights-based jurisprudence, stipulating: "in this
country . . . the right to an abortion is clearly established in

certain prescribed circumstances." 09
French abortion reform was set in motion in the late 1960s,
following decades of staunch pro-natalist governmental stance
prompted by dwindling population during the two World
Wars. 0 The changing role of women, growing sexual openness,
104. Furedi & Nolan, supranote 103, at 7.
105. Erdmann, supra note 103, at 108; JOHN KENYON MASON, THE TROUBLED
PREGNANCY- LEGAL WRONGS AND RIGHTS IN REPRODUCriON 14 (2007).

106. Paton v. British Pregnancy Advisory Service Trustees, [1979] Q.B. 276, at
281-82 (Eng.).
107. Human Rights Act, 1998, c. 42 (Eng.). On the impact of the HRA in English
law, see Ofrit Liviatan, The Impact ofAlternative ConstitutionalRegimes on Religious Freedom
in Canadaand England,31 B.C. INT'L &COMP. L. REV. 45, 46-47, 53-54 (2009).
108. R. (Axon) v. Secretary of State for Health, [2006] EWHC 37 (Eng.).
109. Id. 1 33.
110. Abortion was outlawed in France in Article 317 of the 1810 Napoleonic Penal
Code. Bartha Maria Knoppers, Isabel Brault, & Elizabeth Sloss, Abortion Law in
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over-population growth and life-endangering clandestine
abortions, all generated a growing demand for the reevaluation
of reproductive legislation with the abortion question at its
axis."' Amid "sensational and extreme" public debate framed
along a feminist-conservative and Catholic divide,"'2 the
government introduced in 1975 the Voluntary Interruption of
Pregnancy Act ("VIP Act"), whose "moral thrust [was] much
one of prevention as one of liberalisation.""5 The VIP Act was
"pervaded by compassion for the pregnant women, by concern
for fetal life, and by expression of the commitment of society as
a whole to help minimize occasions for tragic choices between
them.""t4 Accordingly, abortion remained a criminal act,
although one that could be medically authorized until the tenth
week of pregnancy were a woman "in a situation of distress."" 5
Abortion procedure had to be preceded by mandatory
counseling emphasizing family-oriented policies and positive
alternatives to pregnancy, as well as a week long waiting
period." 6 Eighty-one Gaullist and center diputis (deputies) of
the Assemblie Nationale (Lower House of Parliament) opposing
the bill immediately referred it to the review of the Conseil
Constitutionnel, which cleared its enactment.'17 Resting on the
Francophone Countries, 19 AM.

J.

COMP. L. 889, 894 (1990). For a discussion of

Pronatalist politics, see LATHAM, supra note 98, at 82-85. On procreation-enhancing
policies following World War II, see Maggie Allison, The Right to Choose: Abortion in
France,47 PARLIAMENTARY AFF. 222, 223-24 (1994).
111. Allison, supra note 110, at 223-26.
112. DOROTHY MCBRIDE STESTON, WOMEN'S RIGHTS IN FRANCE 65 (1987).
113. Allison, supra note 110, at 230. Law No. 75-17 of 18 January 1975. JOURNAL
OFFICIEL DE LA REPUBLIC FRANCAISE U.O.] [OFFICIAL GAZETTE OF FRANCE], Jan. 18,
1975, p. 739, amended by Law No. 79-1204 of 31 December 1979 JOURNAL OFFICIEL DE
LA R9PUBLIC FRANCAISE J.O.] [OFFICIAL GAZETTE OF FRANCE], Jan. 1, 1980, p. 3. A
summary of the law is available in MARY ANN GLENDON, ABORTION AND DIVORCE IN
WESTERN LAw 146, 155-57 (1987).

114. GLENDON, supranote 113, at 156.
115. Id. at 156; Allison, supra note 110, at 230 (noting the "source of distress"
exception).
116. GLENDON, supra note 113 at 156-57; Allison, supra note 110, at 230;Jean C.

Robinson, Gendering the Abortion Debate: The French Case, in ABORTION POLITICS,
WOMEN'S MOVEMENTS, AND THE DEMOCRATIC STATE 87, 90 (Dorothy McBride ed.,

2001). In 2001, the Conseil Constitutionnel cleared an extension of the ten-week
threshold to twelve. Conseil constitutionnel [CC] [Constitutional Court] decision No.

2001-446DC, July 27, 2001, Rec. 74, available at http://www.utexas.edu/law/
academics/centers/transnational/worknew/french/case.php?id=1008.
117. Conseil constitutionnel [CC] [Constitutional Court] decision No. 74-54DC,
Jan. 15, 1975, Rec. 19, available at http://www.conseil-constitutionnel.fr/conseil-
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statutory requirement of "reasons of distress," the Conseil
Constitutionnelconcluded that the law is not "inconsistent with
any of the fundamental principles recognised by the laws of the
Republic [i.e., respect for life], nor with the principle [of]
"health care to all children."" 8
The law refrained from providing a definition of "a
situation of distress," leaving its determination in the hands of
the pregnant woman.119 Even though this construction was
perceived as degrading by pro-choice activists, it effectively made
abortion a readily available procedure for French women.120 The
law was enacted on a five year trial basis, reinvigorating the prochoice/pro-life conflict.' 2 ' Yet, by the time the law was brought
for reevaluation, the compromise had already taken hold, and
the law was reenacted with minor changes.' 22 One such change
was the inclusion of a duty on the state to actively promote the
principle of respect for life and strengthen family-oriented
policies.'2 3
Until the 1970s abortion was a punishable crime in
Germany.'24 Motivation for reform emerged from the need to
provide solutions for dangerous clandestine abortions, yet
The review of a law's
constitutionnel/root/bank~mm/anglais/a7454d.pdf.
constitutionality can be referred to the Conseil Constitutionnelby sixty Deputies or sixty
Senators. See Louis Favoreu, The Constitutional Council and Parliament in France, in
CONSTITUTIONAL REVIEW AND LEGISLATION: AN INTERNATIONAL COMPARISON 81, 91-93

(Christine Landfried ed., 1988) (discussing the constitutional review process in
France); ALEC STONE SWEET, GOVERNING WITHJUDGES 50-51, 63 (2000).
118. Conseil constitutionnel [CC] [Constitutional Court] decision No. 74-54DC,
supra note 117, at 11 8-11. See James Beardsley, ConstitutionalReview in France, 1975
SuP. Cr. REV. 189, 235-36 (1975).
119. GLENDON, supra note 113, at 15.
120. Dorothy McBride Stetson, Abortion Policy Triads and Women's Rights in Russia,
the

United States, and France, in ABORTION POLITICS: PUBLIC POLICY IN CROSS-CULTURAL

PERSPECTIVE 97, 109 (Marianne Githens & Dorothy McBride Stetson eds., 1996).
121. Allison, supra note 110, at 231; Colette Gallard, France, in ABORTION INTHE
NEW EUROPE: A COMPARATIVE HANDBOOK, supranote 96, at 101, 105.

122. GLENDON, supra note 113, at 18.
123. Id.; see also Yamileth Granizo, Law on Voluntaty Interruption of Pregnancy,
WOMEN'S HEALTHJ.,Jan. 2006, at 15-16 (documenting later changes to the law).
124. Robert E. Jonas & John D. Gorby, West German Abortion Decision: A Contrastto
Roe v. Wade, 9(3) J. MARSHALL J. PRAC. & PROC. 605, 611-12 (1976) (translating
Section 218 of the Imperial Penal Code on the first abortion ruling of the Federal
Administrative Court, 39 BVerfGE 1 (1975) [hereinafter First Abortion Ruling]); see also
Monika Pratzel-Thomas, The Abortion Issue and the FederalConstitutionalCourt, 2 GERMAN
POLITICS 467, 469 (1993).
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disagreements over the method of reform were divided along
liberal-conservative lines.'25
Following lengthy and intense parliamentary deliberations
a narrow majority (247 votes to 233) legalized abortion in the
first trimester when performed by a physician with the consent
of the pregnant woman following mandatory counseling.'26 This
politically-sensitive legislation was immediately challenged by the
Christian Democrats (CDU/CSU) at the Federal Constitutional
Court as incompatible with the fundamental obligation of the
state to protect life under the German basic law.' 27
The German court constructed a constitutional hierarchy
between the protection of the fetus and the personal choice of
the mother, asserting that given Germany's modern history the
obligation of the state to protect the fetus existed "even against
its mother." 28 Thus, the state is constitutionally barred from
legalizing abortion and "must proceed . . . from the duty to
carry the pregnancy to term and . . . view . . . its interruption

as an injustice." 29 Nevertheless, the Court laid out four types of
indications-criminal, medical, eugenic, and social-that if
certified by a physician can render permissible justifications for
abortion.1s0 Mandatory counseling "with the goal of reminding
the pregnant woman of the fundamental duty to respect the

125. See Albin Eser, Reform of German Abortion Law: First Experiences, 34 AM. J.
COMP. L. 369, 372 (1986); Joyce M. Mushaben, Feminism in Four Acts: The Changing
PoliticalIdentity of Women in the FederalRepublic of Germany, in THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF
GERMANY AT FORTY 76, 92 (Peter H. Merkel ed., 1989).
126. See First Abortion Ruling, supra note 124, at 611-12, 621 (providing a
translation of Section 218a-c of the Imperial Penal Code in the version of the Fifth
Statute to Reform the Penal Law (5 PLRS) and the vote tally).
127. See Mushaben, supra note 125, at 92; see also First Abortion Ruling, supra note
124, at 605-09.
128. See FirstAbortion Ruling, supra note 124, at 642.
129. Id. at 644.
130. See id. at 648. The indications are (i) dangers to the life or health of the
pregnant woman (medical indications); (ii) a pregnancy resulting from criminal
offenses such as rape or incest (criminal indications); (iii) severe genetic defects
(eugenic indications); and (iv) a general "social indication" intended to address
circumstances where the continuation of the pregnancy would "impose on the
pregnant woman exceptional hardships comparable in severity to those encompassed
by the other three enumerated indications." See Mary Anne Case, Perfectionism and
Fundamentalism in the Application of the German Abortion Laws, in CONSTITUTING
EQUALITY: GENDER EQUALITY AND COMPARATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL LAw 93, 95-96
(Susan H. Williams ed., 2009).
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right to life of the unborn," was ordered as well.' 3' Complying
with the Court's ruling, the Bundestag enacted the four
indications as permissible justifications for an otherwise unlawful
abortion.132 The law also required social and medical counseling
designed to "make the continuation of the pregnancy and the
situation of the mother and child easier," as well as a three-day
waiting period between the counseling and procedure.'33
Abortions that failed to meet any of these conditions were
punishable with up to a year in prison for the pregnant woman
and up to three years for other participating parties. 34 This
legislation did not end political controversy.135
In the following years, both sides of the abortion debate
manifested growing discontent with the existing legislation. 3 6
The unification of Germany presented an opportunity for
change, since the Indication model of West Germany had to be
reconciled with the abortion on-demand available in East
Germany; a process that "almost brought the German
unification process to a standstill." 3 7 Following a protracted
period of debates, a substantial majority (357 votes to 283) of
the unified Bundestag enacted the Pregnancy and Family
Assistance Act ("PFAA").I" Assuming a preventative (as opposed

131. FirstAbortion Ruling, supra note 124, at 649.
132. DONALD P. KOMMERS, CONSTITUTIONAL JURISPRUDENCE OF THE FEDERAL
REPUBLIC OF GERMANY 347 (2d ed. 1997).
133. See Eser, supra note 125, at 378; Rainer Frank, Federal Republic of Germany:

Three Decisions of the Federal Constitutional Cour, 33 U. LOUISVILLE

J. FAM L. 353, 355

(1995) (noting the specifications of Section 218b of the Criminal Code).
134. See MYRA MARX FERREE ET AL., SHAPING ABORTION DISCOURSE 34-35 (2002).
135. See SWEET, supra note 117, at 110-11; see also KOMMERs, supra note 132, at

347; Susanne Walther, Thou Shalt Not (But Thou Mayest): Abortion After the German
ConstitutionalCourt's 1993 Landmark Decision, 36 GERMAN Y.B. INT'L L. 385, 386 (1993).
136. See FERREE ET AL., supra note 134, at 41; Eva Maleck-Lewy & Myra Marx

Ferree, TalkingAbout Women and Wombs: The Discourse of Abortion and Reproductive Rights
in the G.D.R. During and After the Wende, in REPRODUCING GENDER: POLITICS, PUBLICS,
AND EVERYDAY LIFE AFTER SOCIALISM 92, 94 (Susan Gal & Gail Kligman eds., 2000);

Gabriele Czarnowski, Abortion as a Political Conflict in the Unified Germany, 47
PARLIAMENTARY AFF. 252, 252-54 (1994).
137. SHELDON, supranote 103, at 2.
138. The Pregnancy and Family Assistance Act's full title is The Act for the
Protection of Prenatal/Developing Life, Promotion of a More Child Friendly Society,
Assistance in Pregnancy Conflicts, and Regulation of Pregnancy Termination. See
Protzel-Thomas, supra note 124, at 474 (discussing the debates and providing the final
vote tally); Rosemarie Will, German Unification and the Reform of Abortion Law, 3
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to punitive) approach to abortion, 3 9 the law decriminalized
(declared "not-unlawful") first-trimester abortions for any
reason subject to a counseling requirement, a three-day waiting
period and a doctor's performance of the procedure, 140 along
with additional social measures designed to reduce the need for
abortion. 14 1
Almost immediately the CDU and CSU in the Bundestag,
along with the government of Bavaria, contested the PFAA
before the Federal Constitutional Court.'4 2 The Court annulled
substantial parts of the unified legislation, reaffirming its earlier
rationale on the fundamental unlawfulness of abortion.14-9
However, taking into account the post-unification reality, the
Court amalgamated its original policy framework with additional
preventative measures of assistance and counseling designed to
dissuade abortions.'" According to the Court:
The state does not comply with its obligation to protect the
unborn human life merely by averting attacks emanating
from other human beings. It must also avert the dangers to
this life following from the present and foreseeable real
living conditions of the woman and her family which
adversely affect the readiness to carry the child to term.145
Correspondingly, the Court required the enactment of
legislative measures providing economic and social support to
CARDOZO WOMEN'S L.J. 399, 415 n.86 (1996) (providing a translation of the relevant
article).
139. Blanca Rodrfguex Ruiz & Ute Sacksofsky, Gender in the German Constitution, in
THE GENDER OF CONSTITUTIONAL JURISPRUDENCE 149, 171 (Beverly Baines & Ruth
Rubio-Marin eds., 2005).
140. Pratzel-Thomas, supra note 124, at 477; Christina P. Schlegel, Landmark in

German Abortion Law: The German 1995 Compromise Compared with English Law, 11 INT'L
J. L. POL'Y & FAM. 36, 40-41 (1997).
141. KOMMERS, supra note 132, at 348 (noting that the social measures included
family planning, daycare funding and availability, and education and vocational
training for pregnant women and mothers of young children); FERREE ET AL., supra
note 134, at 42 (noting that the bill increased funding for kindergartens which was
intended to encourage childbearing as an option).
142. Bundesverfassungsgerich [Federal Constitutional Court], May 28, 1993
BVerfGE 88, 203 (Ger.), available at http://www.servat.unibe.ch/dfr/bv088203.html,
translatedin KOMMERS, supra note 132, at 349-54.
143. Will, supra note 138, at 419-21.
144. FERREE ET AL., supra note 134, at 42; Case, supranote 130, at 97.
145. SABINE MICHALOWSKI & LORNA WOODS, GERMAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: THE
PROTECTION OF CIVIL LIBERTIES 145 (1999).
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pregnant women in education, housing, childcare and
employment oriented toward the creation of a "child-friendly"
society.' 46 Among these instructions were specific suggestions for
financial subsidies, proposals on how to protect women from
educational and occupational disadvantages resulting from
childbearing, possible reforms to specific laws (social security
and credit laws), and specific instructions on the duties of
landlords. 4 7 Finally, according to the Court, counseling "must
be orientated towards the protection of the unborn life. Merely
informative counseling ... would not achieve its purpose. The
counselors must have the motivation to encourage the woman to
continue her pregnancy and to provide perspectives for her life
with a child."148
Constrained by the Court's constitutionally acceptable
standards on abortion, the Bundestag then enacted the Court's
framework with minor modification as Germany's current legal
arrangement on abortion. 49 Now in its second decade, judicial
mandate remains uneasy, but acceptable enough not to be
seriously challenged by either side of the abortion debate. 50
In the Netherlands, reform proposals surfaced in 1970 as
part of growing pressures by women's organizations, academics,
and the medical community to rectify discrepancies between
restrictive nineteenth century legislation and contemporary
practices enabling abortion.'5 ' Yet, the legislative reform came to

146. See Walther, supra note 135, at 394.
147. See Gerald L. Neuman, Casey in the Mirror: Abortion, Abuse and the Right to
Protectionin the United States and Germany, 43 AM.J. COMP. L. 273, 281 (1995).
148. MICHALOWSKI & WOODS, supra note 145, at 146.
149. See Will, supra note 138, at 422-23, n.112. The revised law maintained
abortion's unlawfulness, merging non-indicated abortions for the first trimester with
the indication model of the first German ruling and an expansive pro-child counseling
model. See Schlegel, supranote 140, at 45-48.
150. See FERREE ET AL., supranote 134, at 43; Case, supra note 130, at 99; Neuman,
supra note 147, at 273.
151. Prior to reform, abortion was outlawed in Articles 295-98 of the Penal Code
1886, as amended by the Morality Act of 1911. See Matthijs de Blois, The Netherlands, in
ABORTION AND PROTECTION OF THE HUMAN FETUS: LEGAL PROBLEMS IN A CROSSCULTURAL PERSPECTIVE 167, 170-71 (S.J Frankowski & G.F. Cole eds., 1987); SARAH L.
HENDERSON & ALANA S.JEYDEL, WOMEN AND POLITICS IN A GLOBAL WORLD 198 (2d ed.

2010); Everett Ketting, Netherlands, in ABORTION IN THE NEW EUROPE: A COMPARATIVE

HANDBOOK, supra note 96, at 173, 173-74; Joyce Outshoorn, The Rules of the Game:
Abortion Politics in the Netherlands, in THE NEW POLITICS OF ABORTION, supranote 103, at
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pass only after an eleven year delay resulting from political
opposition and parliamentary stalemates facilitated by the
Netherlands' multi-party politics.' 5 2 The Termination of
Pregnancy Act of 1981 was enacted by the narrowest majority of
votes (76 to 74 in the First Chamber; 38 to 37 in the Second
Chamber) and came into force only three years later, after
additional regulations designed to ensure that any decision to
terminate a pregnancy carefully balanced the protection of the
fetus and the rights of the mother were issued.'53 Abortion was
decriminalized until the twenty-fourth week when a woman is in
a "distressed situation" with "no other choice," a determination
made by the woman in consultation with a physician.' 54
Additional requirements stipulated that abortions will be
performed in licensed medical facilities, mandatory counseling,
a five day waiting period and a system of aftercare as well as
governmental financing for legal abortions.'55
Finally, a conscientious clause exempted physicians from
the duty to perform or arrange for abortions.156 This legal
reform "pacif[ied] the abortion issue . . . and public opinion
5,

17

[hereinafter

INTERNATIONAL

Outshoorn Rules]; Jany

HANDBOOK ON ABORTION

Rademakers,

The Netherlands, in

333, 333-35 (Paul Sachdev ed., 1988).

152. See de Blois, supra note 151, at 175-77; Jeanne de Bruijn & Barbara Henkes,
The Women's Strike in Holland 1981, 12 FEMINIST REV. 37, 37-38 (1982); HENDERSON &
JEYDEL, supra note 151, at 198-99; Joyce Outshoorn, Policy-Making on Abortion: Arenas,
Actors, and Arguments in the Netherlands, in ABORTION POLITICS, WOMEN'S MOVEMENTS,
AND THE DEMOCRATIC STATE, supra note 116, at 205, 206 [hereinafter Outshoorn PolicyMaking] (discussing the political debates that delayed legislative reform); Outshoorn
Rules, supra note 151, at 19-22.
153. See Termination of Pregnancy Act of I May 1981, Stb. 1981, p. 257 § 5(1)
[hereinafter Termination of Pregnancy Act]; Decree on the Termination of Pregnancy
of 17 May 1984, Stb. 1984, p. 356, available at http://www.hsph.harvard.edu/
population/abortion/NETHERLANDS.abo.htm
[hereinafter
Decree
on the
Termination of Pregnancy]; Marc Groenhuijsen & Floris van Laanen, Euthanasiain the
Broader Framework of Dutch Penal Policies, in EUTHANASIA INTHE BROADER FRAMEWORK
OF DUTCH PENAL POLICIES 195, 196 (Marc Goenhuijsen & Floris van Laanen eds.,
2006) ("[The 1981 Act] was specifically designed to warrant a careful decision-making
process before any abortion can take place."). Article 296(5) of the Dutch Penal Code
now states that termination of pregnancies "is not punishable where the treatment was
given by a physician at a hospital or clinic where such treatment is legal under the
Termination of Pregnancy Act." See THE DUTCH PENAL CODE 201 (Louise Rayar &
Stafford Wadsworth trans., 1997); Outshoorn Policy-Making,supra note 152, at 216.
154. Termination of Pregnancy Act, supra note 153, § 5.
155. Id. §§ 2, 3; Decree on Termination of Pregnancy, supra note 153, §§ 2, 3, 8,
25; see also Rademakers, supranote 151, at 336.
156. Termination of Pregnancy Act, supra note 153, § 20.
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on the whole has been supportive of its content" keeping it in
force thus far.'5 7
In Italy, abortion debates sparked in the early 1970s as part
of broader socio-political debates over the public role of
Catholicism and patriarchal dominance in society.'58 It instantly
became "the most discussed issue in the country" with women's
groups and the political left rallying around the idea of women's
choice against a consolidating pro-life movement of Christian
"good Catholics."' 59 Amid ongoing
and
Democrats
parliamentary debates over possible avenues to reform the
fascist regime's criminalization of abortion, the tribunal of
Milan remitted existing abortion law for constitutional review
arising as part of criminal abortion proceeding.16 The Italian
Corte Costituzionale (Constitutional Court), concerned by the rise
in life-threatening backstreet abortions, declared the existing
law unsatisfactory in giving absolute priority to the fetus's
constitutional right without adequate protection to the health of
the mother.' 6 i Addressing a heated political atmosphere in an
overwhelmingly Catholic nation, the ruling contributed to the
mobilization of both camps, but at the same time, framed the
direction of the legislative debates toward reaching an
acceptable compromise over contested values.'62 Following
additional back and forth legislative deliberations, the two
157. Outshoorn Policy-Making, supra note 152, at 205; see also Groenhuijsen & van
Laanen, supra note 153, at 195; HENDERSON &JEYDEL, supra note 151, at 197; Ketting,

supra note 151, at 173,176; Rademakers, supra note 151, at 336.
158. See Marina Calloni, Debates and Controversieson Abortion in Italy, in ABORTION
POLITICS, WOMEN'S MOVEMENTS AND THE DEMOCRATIC STATE, supra note 116, at 184,
184-86; PATRICK HANAFIN, CONCEIVING LIFE: REPRODUCTIVE POLITICS AND THE LAW IN

CONTEMPORARY ITALY 28-30 (2007); Jacqueline Andall, Abortion, Politics and Gender in
Italy, 47 PARLIAMENTARY AFF. 238-39 (1994).

159. Eleonore Eckmann Pisciotta, Challenging the Establishment: The Case of
Abortion, in THE NEW WOMEN'S MOVEMENT 26,35,40 (Drude Dahlerup ed., 1986).
160. Calloni, supra note 158, at 185 (discussing the increased public debates on
gender specific issues). The process of indirect constitutional review arising as part of
judicial proceedings in Italy is discussed in Alessandro Pizzorusso, ConstitutionalReview
and Legislation in Italy, in

CONSTITUTIONAL

REVIEW

AND

LEGISLATION:

AN

INTERNATIONAL COMPARISON, supra note 117, at 109, 109. On the parliamentary
debates over abortion, see generally Lesley Caldwell, Abortion in Italy, 7 FEMINIST REV.
49, 52-59 (1981).
161. Carmosina et al., Corte Cost., 18 Febbraio 1975, nn. 27, 43 Racc. uff. corte
cost. 2011975, translated excerpts available at MAURO CAPPELLETTI & WILLIAM COHEN,
COMPARATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 612-14 (1979).

162. Calloni, supra note 158, at 186; GLENDON, supra note 113, at 43.
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houses of parliament finally approved Law no. 194 of 22 May
1978 entitled Norms for the Social Protection of Motherhood
and the Voluntary Termination of Pregnancy ("Law 194"),63
whose title and content reflected the depth of the political
compromise.164 Abortion was not removed from the criminal
code, but the law established conditions-health, economic,
social, or family circumstances-under which legal abortions in
the first ninety days of pregnancy were permitted.'65
Although the ultimate decision on whether to terminate a
pregnancy was left with the woman, the law prescribed medical
and social counseling specifically designed to help her overcome
the circumstances leading to the abortion decision.'66 Following
this substantive consultation, if the woman still wanted her
pregnancy terminated, a seven-day waiting period "to reflect"
was required to elapse (absent a state of emergency), as medical
personnel were granted the right to conscientiously object to
performing abortions.'67
The enactment of the law did not end public contestations.
The heated debate finally culminated in 1981 with simultaneous
referendum initiatives challenging the law-a liberal one to
legalize abortions and a conservative one to revoke them.6*
Both referendums failed, indicating that a general consensus
had emerged on the contours of Law 194.169 This conclusion is

further supported by repeated judicial rejections of abortion

163. Legge 22 maggio 1978, n. 194 [Italian Law No. 194 of May 22, 1978] in G.U.2
May 1978, n. 140 (It.), translation available at http://www.hsph.harvard.edu/
population/abortion/ITALY.abo.htm.
164. Id. §1 ("[T]he state guarantees the right to responsible and planned
parenthood, recognizes the social value of motherhood and shall protect human life
from its inception."). See generally Irene Figh-Talamanca, Italy, in INTERNATIONAL
HANDBOOK ON ABORTION 279-92 (Paul Sachdev ed., 1988); Andall, supra note 158, at
244.
165. Italian Law No. 194 of May 22, 1978 at §4; see also Calloni, supra note 158, at
188.
166. Italian Law No. 194 of May 22, 1978 at § 5.
167. Id
168. See MACHTELD NIJSTEN,
COMPARATIVE EUROPEAN-AMERICAN

ABORTION AND CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: A
STUDY 102 (1990) (discussing referendum

proposals).
169. Figh-Talamanca, supra 164, at 282; Andall, supra note 158, at 245.
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challenges over the years, leaving the 1978 legal compromise
thus far intact.170
The tumultuous abortion politics engulfing Western
Europe from the late 1960s to the late 1980s ended with the
Belgian reform in 1990. An arrest of a physician performing
abortions in the early 1970s mobilized intense political
controversies, generating dozens of legislative proposals and a
long political stalemate over reforming the criminalization of
abortion under the Penal Code.1'7 Closely resembling the
French and Dutch compromises, the Law on the Termination of
Pregnancy of 1990 decriminalized abortion in the first trimester
when the woman is in a "state of distress as a result of her
situation."17 2 The law required a six day waiting period and
mandatory counseling on alternatives to abortion, but left the
decision as to the state of distress to the sole discretion of the
woman and her physician's confirmation.17 The refusal of the
Catholic King to then sign the law and bring it into effect
necessitated a creative political solution. The King was declared
"unable to govern" for a day to avert a constitutional crisis and
allow the law to pass. 74
Hence, a period of turbulent abortion politics between the
late 1960s and the late 1980s concluded with the emergence of
relatively cohesive legislative compromises across Western
Europe. Their main feature was to maintain normative
170. In 1997, another attempt at referendum over Law 194 reached the
Constitutional Court, which was dismissed on the grounds that the existing law "has as
its rationale and guiding values precisely those values of motherhood and the
protection of human life." HANAFIN, supra note 158, at 33.
171. CODE PPNAL [C. PIN] arts. 348-53 (Belg.). See also Reed Boland, Recent
Developments in Abortion Law in Industrial Countries, 18 LAW, MED. & HEALTH CARE 405,
410 (1990) (discussing Articles 348-53 of the Penal Code of 1867); Karen Celis, The
Abortion Debates in Belgium 1974-1990, in ABORTION POLITICS, WOMEN'S MOVEMENTS,
AND THE DEMOCRATIC STATE, supra note 116, at 39, 39-61 (discussing the political
debates); Vicky Claeys, Belgium, in ABORTION IN THE NEW EUROPE: A COMPARATIVE
HANDBOOK, supra note 96, at 19, 19-23.
172. Loi du 3 Avril 1990 relative I l'interruption volontaire de grossesse [The Law
of Apr. 3, 1990 on the Termination of Pregnancy], MONITEUR BELGE [M.B.] [Official
Gazette of Belgium], Apr. 5, 1990), 6379-80, translated in 17 ANN. REV. POP. L. 336
(1990) [hereinafter Belgium Termination Law].
173. Belgium Termination Law, supra note 172.
174. Joyce Outshoorn, The Stability of Compromise: Abortion Politicsin Western Europe,
in ABORTION POLITICS: PUBLIC POLICY IN CROSS-CULTURAL PERSPECTIVE, supra note

120, at 145, 158.
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disapproval toward the termination of pregnancies as part of
vital concern for the unborn life, yet permit abortion during the
first trimester (and even in later weeks when the well-being of
the woman is at stake) in the interest of protecting the freedom
of the woman to choose once several safeguards were fulfilled.
These safeguards included: (i) mandatory waiting periods, (ii)
limitations on places where abortions can be performed, (iii)
processes for decision-making on abortion, and (iv) social and
financial incentives for life with a child. Finally, conscientious
exemption clauses have also acted as controversy-pacifying
strategies.
1II. COMPARING LA W'S SOCIAL ROLE IN
WESTERN-EUROPEAN CULTURAL DEBATES
Problem-driven, inference-oriented qualitative inquiry, a
common research methodology in the social sciences, has been
gradually permeating comparative constitutional analysis.175 Its
similar case studies research design does not necessitate an exact
match of variables in case study selection. Rather, resemblance is
necessary in the non-central characteristics of the cases along
with varying independent and dependent variables. 76 As the
principal cultural conflicts engaging Europe in recent decades,
abortion and Islam-based controversies seem to conform to this
research design. The surveys above highlight how in these
conflicts law-making institutions across this constant set of
countries attempted to address the constitutional clash between
fundamental rights and religious creeds. The two case studies
differed in that the abortion debates engaged the beliefs of
Western Europe's religious majority, while its largest religious
minority currently follows Islam. Moreover, these issues vary in
their contentiousness, namely a pacified pro-choice/pro-life
politics compared with deeply seated Islam-based controversies
that are currently at the forefront of Europe's cultural clashes.
175. See generally Ran Hirschl, The Question of Case Selection in Comparative
Constitutional Law, 53 AM. J. COMP. L. 125, 125-55 (2005); Christopher A. Whytock,
Taking Causality Seriously in Comparative Constitutional Law: Insights from Comparative
Politicsand ComparativePoliticalEconomy, 41 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 629, 629-82 (2008).
176. See John Gerring, Case Selection for Case-Study Analysis: Qualitative and
Quantitative Techniques, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF POLITICAL METHODOLOGY 645,
645-48 (Janet M. Box-Steffensmeier et al. eds., 2008).
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To substantiate the thesis of this Article-that this
difference in intensity can be plausibly explained through the
contribution of a legal process diverging along its social
functions (integrative versus transformative)-attention is now
turned to assessing the realization of law's social function in
each of the debates, namely (i) law's contribution to resolving
the abortion conflict and (ii) law's capacity in transforming
European Islam. The legal outcomes of abortion policies enacted
across Western Europe between the late 1960s to the late 1980s
were undoubtedly transformative in responding to pressing
social problems and legalizing avenues for abortions.
Nonetheless, the legal process ushering these outcomes has
clearly taken an integrative approach enabling tensed
compromises that ultimately moved society forward.
Moreover, while there are many ways to pursue social
change in the modern world (economic factors, technology,
protest, and so forth), law as a strategy of social change has been
largely harnessed with safeguarding rights and reversing
inequalities.' 7 7 Nonetheless, the primary narrative in Western
European abortion laws has not been rights focused, but one of
rights protection interwoven with economic policies, social
concerns over family welfare, and political objectives for the
society as a whole. Particularly striking in this regard has been
the British example. Despite launching the common law system
where the judiciary has become the "institution of choice" for
activists seeking social change, British courts have shown an
unwavering stance to keep the "medicalized" statutory
compromise regardless of an institutional capacity to override
them.178
In principle, legal arrangements that side step rights-based
narratives could have worked against the entrenchment of
abortion rights. American observers even suggested that the
European legal compromises codifying pro-life rhetoric with
pro-choice options are "empty promise[s]," if not "hypocrisy,"
that "can take an unacceptably high toll on confidence in the
177. See generally CAROL HARLOW & RICHARD RAWLINGS, PRESSURE THROUGH LAW
(1992); GERALD M. ROSENBERG, THE HOLLOW HOPE: CAN COURTS BRING ABOUT
SOCIAL CHANGE? 2, 430 (2d ed. 2008).
178. Tom Ginsburg, The Global Spread of Constitutional Review, in THE OXFORD
HANDBOOK OF LAW AND POLITICS 81, 81, 89 (Keith E. Whittington et al. eds., 2008).
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rule of law and the integrity of the legal system as a whole." 7 9
Nonetheless, evidence suggests that the uneasy reconciliation of
opposing principles seemed to have been quite effective. Recent
years have been marked by tranquility in abortion debates, with
feasible, durable access to abortion across Western Europe. 80
This is not to imply that Western European abortion debates are
over. The political nature of the law, namely the recognition
that shifts in political power could translate into legal change,
remains an ever-attractive incentive for pro-life/pro-choice
politics.' 8 ' Yet, when compared to the tensed debates currently
engaging the United States, contemporary Western-European
controversies over abortion are irrefutably moderate. 82
Consequently, how effective has the attempt to Europeanize
Muslims been thus far? Naturally, any such assessment is
premature considering the prominence of the controversies, the
freshness of the adopted legal measures, and the variation in
Muslim integration across different European countries. Yet,
interim observations are at the very least not particularly
encouraging. Whereas studies highlighted aspects of Muslim
assimilation, these are regularly amalgamated by discussions of
Muslim radicalization particularly among the younger Muslim
generations experiencing stigmatization, alienation and social
marginalization. 183 Consequently, literature is mounting with
179. See Kim Lane Scheppele, ConstitutionalizingAbortion, in ABORTION POLITICS:
PUBLIC POLICY IN CROSS-CULTURAL PERSPECTIVES, supra note 120, at 46, 46-47;
Lawrence H. TRIBE, ABORTION: THE CLASH OF ABSOLUTES 73-74 (1990).

180. See Outshoorn, supra note 174, at 145. A recent comparative examination of
abortion availability in Western Europe and the United States concluded that "Western
Europe has had a quite stable abortion environment. In contrast to the situation in the
USA, access to abortion providing facilities. . . is substantially easier ... [and] free
from the extremes of violence and controversy that have characterized abortion care in
the USA." Carolejoffe, Abortion and Medicine: A SociopoliticalHistory, in MANAGEMENT OF
UNINTENDED AND ABNORMAL PREGNANCIES 1, 4 (Maureen Paul et al. eds., 2009); see

also Giovanni Bognetti, The Concept of Human Dignity in European and US
Constitutionalism, in EUROPEAN AND US CONSTITUTIONALISM 85, 88 (Georg Notle ed.,
2005) (arguing that European abortion laws are "liberal in practice.").
181. See Liviatan, Faith in the Law, supra note 95 (discussing the political nature of
law).
182. See Ofrit Liviatan, Social Change v. Social Peace: Comparing Law's Role in
American and Western European Conflict over Abortion, in RELIGION AND CONSTITUTION
(Ana Maria Celis, ed., forthcoming).
183. AYHAN KAYA, ISLAM, MIGRATION AND INTEGRATION 7-8 (2009); JYrrE
KLAUSEN, THE ISLAMIC CHALLENGE: POLITICS AND RELIGION IN WESTERN EUROPE
(2005); JONATHAN LAURENCE & JUSTIN VAISSE, INTEGRATING ISLAM: POLITICAL AND
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urgent calls for the institutionalization of dialogue with Muslim
communities and the strengthening of their political and social
engagement.' 84 Moreover, the recent global financial recession
suggests the probability of greater complications for Muslim
integration. Rising unemployment, the curbing of social welfare
programs and deteriorating working and living conditions do
not hold great promise for accelerating the integration of a
community already suffering from poverty and ghettoization.
A further validation to law's diverging role in the debates
over abortion and Islam derives from the shortcomings of
alternative explanations. One possible explanation may be the
time factor. Europe's abortion dilemmas are decades distant
compared with ongoing battles over Islam's place in the
European public sphere. Hence, an argument can be made that
the study effectively compares a long-finished legal product with
legal solutions in the making. Nonetheless, as revealed by the
foregoing sections, legal proceedings pertaining to each of the
conflicts have taken quite a different path from the get-go. The
legal process proved pivotal in institutionalizing structures and
processes for dialogue and compromise over abortion reform. 85
In France, the Conseil Constitutionnel's affirmation of the
"distress" formula legitimized the legislative reconciliation that
rejected abortion on-demand but left recourse to abortion in
exceptional circumstances at the woman's discretion. In
Germany, the Federal Constitutional Court dictated not once,
but twice the constitutionally acceptable standards for abortion
against popular legislative constructions. Mirroring the German
jurisprudence in an overwhelmingly Catholic nation, the Italian
RELIGIOUS CHALLENGES IN CONTEMPORARY FRANCE 170 (2006); Bhiku Parekh, Europe,
Liberalism and the Muslim Question, in MULTICULTURALISM, MUSLIMS AND CITIZENSHIP,
supranote 39, at 179, 179 (Tariq Modood et al. eds., 2006). For the British context, see
QUINTAN WiKTOROwICz, RADICAL ISLAM RISING: MUSLIM EXTREMISM IN THE WEST
(2005).
184. Recent selective examples include: ZEYNO BARAN, CITIZEN ISLAM: THE
FUTURE OF MUSLIM INTEGRATION INTHE WEST 177-82 (2011); ISLAM & EUROPE: CRISES
ARE CHALLENGES 8 (Marie-Claire Foblets & Jean-Yves Carlier eds., 2010); Olivier Roy,
Islamist Terroristsand Radicalization, in EUROPEAN ISLAM: CHALLENGES FOR SOCIETY AND
PUBLIC POLICY, supra note 4, at 56, 5&-57. See generallyJOHN R. BOWEN, CAN ISLAM BE
FRENCH: PLURALISM AND PRAGMATISM IN A SECULARIST STATE (2010); JUSTIN GEST,
APART: ALIENATED AND ENGAGED MUSLIMS IN THE WEST (2010).

185. See generally Donald P. Kommers, Liberty and Community in ConstitutionalLaw:
The Abortion Cases in ComparativePerspective, 1985 BYU L. REV. 371 (1985).
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Constitutional Court invalidated an exclusively pro-life
arrangement, instructing the parliament to seek a more
balanced statutory resolution. Similar integrative processes were
evident as part of protracted legislative debates in the
Netherlands and Britain, allowing the emergence of refined
compromises between competing values.
In a striking departure from this compromise-effectuating
function of the legal process in the abortion context, the
willingness of legislators and judges to construct legal
compromises in the context of Islamic practices has been
effectively nonexistent. Echoing a growing social anxiety over
the spread of Islam, 86 legal proceedings have largely corrected
and contained Islamic practices in the public sphere. With the
formal recognition of Islam yet to be achieved in the
"concordat-type regimes"' 87 of Germany and Italy, opportunities
regularly arose to restrict the building of mosques, outlaw the
burqinisin public pools and limit halal slaughter.'88 Along similar
lines, social and cultural assimilation has become the defining
element in immigration and educational policies. Compared
with abortion jurisprudence, judicial rulings on Islamic practices
revealed an overall deference by courts to the prevailing social
attitudes. As illustrated above, Islamic veiling was construed
extremist and backward in the rulings of Begum, Sahin and
Dahlab, as well as in the Conseil d'Etat's rejection of the
immigration petition by a niqab-wearing woman and the
subsequent clearance by the Conseil Constitutionnelof the ban on
186. See Casanova, supra note 4, at 65-67.
187. The term is borrowed from Valdrie Amiraux, Discriminationand Claims for
Equal Rights Amongst Muslims in Europe, in EUROPEAN MUSLIMS AND THE SECULAR

STATE, supra note 4, at 25, 26.
188. See Silvio Ferrari, The Secularity of the State and the Shaping of Muslim
Representative Organizationin Western Europe, in EUROPEAN MUSLIMS AND THE SECULAR
STATE, supra note 4, at 11, 11; see also Sara Silvestri, Public Policies Towards Muslims and
the Institutionalizationof "ModerateIslam" in Europe: Some Critical Reflections, in MUSLIMS
IN 21sT CENTURY EUROPE, supra note 3, at 44, 47-49; Sara Silvestri, Muslim Institutions
and Political Mobilization, in EUROPEAN ISLAM: CHALLENGES FOR SOCIETY AND PUBLIC

POLICY, supra note 4, at 169, 173-75 (Samir Amghar et al. eds., 2007); Dilwar Hussain,
The Holy Grail of Muslims in Western Europe: Representation and Their Relationship With the
State, in MODERNIZING ISLAM: RELIGION INTHE PUBLIC SPHERE INTHE MIDDLE EAST AND
EUROPE 215 (John L. Esposito & Francois Bugart eds., 2003); Bernard Goddard, Official
Recognition of Islam, in EUROPEAN ISLAM: CHALLENGES FOR SOCIETY AND PUBLIC POLICY,

supra note 4, at 183, 183; Aluffi Beck Peccoz, Islam in the European Union: Italy, in ISLAM
AND THE EUROPEAN UNION 181, 187 (R. Potz & W. Wieshaider eds., 2004).
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the full face veil. More restrainedly, yet in clear contrast to its
proactively mediating role in the context of abortion, the
German Federal Constitutional Court left a legal vacuum in
Ludin orienting the legislative process toward bans. A similar
controversial path was evident in the German judicial approach
to halal slaughtering. Finally, by coining an ambiguous
balancing test the Conseil d'Etat effectively, even if
unintentionally, paved the course for the eventual French ban
on headscarves in schools.
Moreover, these differences in either of the debates cannot
be explained under the normative premise that courts provide
for greater protection of minorities compared with
legislatures. 89 Proponents of constitutional review will likely
point to the German federal rulings protecting halal
slaughtering, earlier judicial exemptions from coed swimming
classes, the Swiss courts' positions on minarets and the French
and German permissive jurisprudence on Islamic veiling as
evidence for judicial willingness to protect Islamic practices. Yet,
this argument is severely weakened in comparison to the pivotal
role of constitutional courts in furthering the abortion debate
toward legal resolutions. Moreover, not only were judicial
rulings protecting Islamic practices seemingly scarce, but when
courts opted to limit Islamic practices the grounds offered in
these rulings to justify such limitations all seem to support the
alignment of courts with the growing popular push to "civilize"
and "adjust" Islamic practices.
Finally, even the argument that limitations on Islamic
practices should be viewed as the outcome of substantive
constitutional balancing between the right to religious freedom
and other fundamental rights and interests of multicultural

189. See THE FEDERALIST No. 78 (Alexander Hamilton) (Terrence Ball ed., 2003)
(providing early justifications for judicial review). Selected contemporary sources
include DWORKIN, supra note 93; CHRISTOPHER L. EISGRUBER, CONSTITUTIONAL SELFGOVERNMENT (2001); and JOHN ELY HART, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF
JUDICIAL REVIEW (1980). For the competing view see RICHARD BELLAMY, POLITICAL
CONSTITUTIONALISM (2007); Jeremy Waldron, The Core of the Case Against judicial
Review, 115 YALE L.J. 1346 (2006). Arguments summarized in Ofrit Liviatan, judicial

Activism and Religion-Based Tensions in India and Israel 26 ARIZJ. INT'L & COMP. L. 583,
587 (2009).
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societies'90 does not seem to counteract the premise of this
study. Rationales offered in the rulings on Islamic veiling, halal
slaughtering and co-ed classes that restricted Islamic practices
reveal just how little emphasis was given to the fact that the
Islamic practices at stake may actually be true manifestations of
religious beliefs.
Europe's growing secularization could be suggested as
another alternative explanation to the pacification of abortion
politics and the continent's general unreceptiveness to Islamic
manifestations in the public square. Notwithstanding the
sociological disagreements over the true nature of Europe's
secularization,' 9 1 the surveyed data challenges this explanation
in either context as well. European secularization was one of
many social developments prompting the reform of abortion
restrictions. Pressing social needs, including clandestine
dangerous abortions, dwindling population, the thalidomide
problem, as well as specific historical developments such as the
unification of Germany, all acted as pivotal engines of reform in
the reconsideration of abortion laws. Moreover, in every case
examined earlier, reform processes met fierce anti-abortion
religious opposition leading to protracted debates stretching the
reform process over many years.
In the context of Islamic practices, European observers
have explained the forceful integrationist approach in the
pervasive identification of Islam as a security threat rather than a
sheer commitment to secularism.192 Securitization concerns have
190. See Roscoe Pound, A Survey of Social Interests, 57 HARV. L. REV. 1, 39 (1943)
(advocating for balancing). More recent advocacy for balancing includes AHARON
BARAK, THEJUDGE IN A DEMOCRACY 164, 173 (2006); DAVID M. BEATIY, THE ULTIMATE

RULE OF LAW 159-61 (2004); Stephen Gardbaum, A DemocraticDefense of Constitutional
Balancing,4 L. & ETHICS HUM. RTS. 73, 84-85 (2010).

191. Scholarship countering European secularization include Jost CASANOVA,
PUBLIC RELIGION IN THE MODERN WORLD (1994); GRACE DAVIE, RELIGION IN BRITAIN
SINCE 1945: BELIEVING WITHOUT BELONGING (1994); and Rodney Stark, Secularization
R.I.P., 60 Soc. RELIGION 249 (1999).

192. The Radicalisation of Muslim Youth in Europe: The Reality and the Scale of the
Threat, Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Europe and Emerging Threats of the H. Comm. on
International
Relations,
101st
Cong.
1
(2005),
available
at
http://www.investigativeproject.org/documents/testimony/302.pdf (last visited Oct.
27, 2011) (statement of Claude Moniquet, Director General, European Strategic
Intelligence and Security Center); Erik Bleich, State Responses to "Muslim" Violence: A
Comparison of Six West European Countries, in MUSLIMS AND THE STATE INTHE POST 9/11
WEST 9, 10 (Erik Bleich ed., 2010); see also KAYA, supra note 183, at 7-11.
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been leading politicians and academics to conflate "factors such
as immigrant background, ethnicity, socio-economic deprivation
and the war on terror with Islam as a religion," justifying
exclusionary politics and anti-immigration attitudes. 93 If any,
these securitization concerns may have actually strengthened
Europe's Christian identity rather than dissolved it, as Christian
forces proved pivotal in advancing bans on the Islamic veil, halal
slaughtering, and the ban on minarets.194
CONCLUSION
Western Europe undoubtedly faces complex and pressing
challenges in coping with its changing socio-cultural
composition. Yet, so far the surveyed data suggests that legal
processes have been reflecting the prevailing social panic over
the "Islamic threat" rather than act as conflict-defusing
instruments in the debates over Islam and the European public
sphere. Decades old legal reforms on abortion present an
opportunity to reconceptualize the law's role in pacifying sociocultural tensions, as once fiercely-fought abortion controversies
have substantially subsided even as value-based disagreements
endured.
The rise of judicialized politics in recent decades, namely
"the infusion of judicial decision-making and of court-like
procedures into political arenas," 95 gave rise to a growing body
of scholarship representing two leading scholarly approaches.
On the one hand, rooted in Marxist and realism theories the
"critical" literature demonstrated the role of the courts in
disguising and legitimizing social hierarchies, 96 in lacking a
193. See KAYA, supra note 183, at 2.
194. PeterJ. Katzenstein, Multiple Modernitiesas Limits to SecularEuropeanization,in
RELIGION IN AN EXPANDING EUROPE, supra note 4, at 1, 33 (Timothy A. Byrnes & Peter
J. Katzenstein eds., 2006) ("[R]eligion continues to lurk underneath the veneer of
European secularization.").
195. Torbj6m Vallinder, When the Courts Go Marching In, in THE GLOBAL
EXPANSION OFJUDICIAL POWER 13, 13 (Neal C. Tate & Torbjnn Vallinder eds., 1995).
See MARTIN SHAPIRO & ALEC STONE SWEET, ON LAW, POLITICS AND JUDICIALIZATION 1
(2002); see generally John Ferejohn, Judicializing Politics, Politicizing Law, 65 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 41 (2002); Ran Hirschl, TheJudicializationof Mega-Politics and the Rise
of PoliticalCourts, 11 ANN. REV. POL. SC. 93 (2008).
196. See generally V. KERRUISH, JURISPRUDENCE AS IDEOLOGY (1991); DUNCAN
KENNEDY, A CRITIQUE OF ADJUDICATION: FIN DE SIECLE (1997). For collections offering
an overview of Critical Legal Studies, see THE POLITICS OF LAW: A PROGRESSIVE
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meaningful judicial impact on public policy compared with
political and cultural factors, 97 and lastly, in offering paths to
overcome legislative stalemates or structural barriers to the
ideological goals of the dominant national coalition. 98 On the
other hand, the "refined" approach focused on analyzing
judicial processes as instrumental in providing strategic
possibilities to achieve political goals in the long term that are
unencumbered or may even be strengthened by legislative or
administrative circumventions in the short term. 1 The surveyed
examples in the context of Islam further substantiate the critical
view of the legal process. Nevertheless, since law increasingly
CRITIQUE (David Kairys ed., 1990); RADICAL PHILOSOPHYOF LAw (D. Caudill & S. Stone
eds., 1994). Peter Gabel & Paul Harris, Building Powerand Breaking Images: CriticalLegal

Theory and the Practice of Law, 11 N.Y.U. REV. L. & Soc. CHANCE 368 (1982). For a
critique, see Alan Hunt, The Critiqueof Law: What is "Critical"AboutCriticalLegal Theory?,
14J. L. & Soc'Y 5, 7-8 (1987). On the influence of Marxist theories and legal realism,
see VAGO, supranote 2, at 66.
197. ROSENBERG, supra note 177, at 72; see also MARK V. TUSHNET, TAKING THE
CONSTITUTION AWAY FROM THE COURTS (1999).

198. Howard Gillman, How Political Parties Can Use the Courts to Advance Their
Agendas: FederalCourts in the United States, 1875-91, 96, AM. POL. SCI. REV. 511, 517-21
(2002); Mark A. Graber, The Nonmajoritarian Difficulty: Legislative Deference to the
Judiciary, 7 STUD. Am. POL. DEV. 35, 35-46 (1993); Stefan Voigt & Eli M. Salzberger,
Choosing Not to Choose: When Politicians Choose to Delegate Powers, 55 KYKLOs 289, 293-300
(2002); Keith E. Whittington, "Interpose Your Friendly Hand": Political Supports for the
Exercise ofjudicial Review by the United States Supreme Court, 99 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 583,
584-94 (2005). On courts' roles in "hegemonic preservation" of endangered groups
elites, see RAN HIRSCHL, TOWARDSJURISTOCRACY (2004).
199. Legal mobilization and agenda-setting is discussed in A.M. MARSHALL,
CONFRONTING SEXUAL HARASSMENT: THE LAW AND POLITICS OF EVERDAY LIFE (2005);
MICHAEL W. MCCANN, RIGHTS AT WORK: PAY EQUITY REFORM AND THE POLITICS OF
LEGAL MOBILIZATION (1994); S.M. OLSON, CLIENTS AND LAWYERS: SECURING THE
RIGHTS OF DISABLED PERSONS (1984); STUART A. SCHEINGOLD, THE POLITICS OF
RIGHTS (2d ed. 2004); HELENA SILVERSTEIN, UNLEASHING RIGHTS: LAW, MEANING, AND
THE ANIMAL RIGHTS MOVEMENT (1996). Opportunity structures are discussed in E.
ANDERSEN, OUT OF THE CLOSETS AND INTO THE COURTS (2006); CHARLES R. EPp, THE
RIGHTS REVOLUTION: LAWYERS, ACTIVISTS, AND SUPREME COURTS IN COMPARATIVE
PERSPECTIVES (1998). Strategic usages of law analyzed in critical feminist and race
theory can be found in FEMINIST LEGAL THEORY (K. B. Artlett & R. Kennedy eds.,
1991); MARI MATSUDA, WHERE IS YOUR BODY? (1996); RICHARD DELGADO & JEAN
STEFANIC, CRITICAL RACE THEORY (2001); KIMBERLE W. CRENSHAW ET AL., CRITICAL
RACE THEORY: THE KEY WRITINGS THAT FORMED THE MOVEMENT (1995); Phyllis

Goldfarb, From the Worlds of "Others": Minority and Feminist Responses to Critical Legal
Studies, 26 NEW. ENG. L. REV. 683, 689-707 (1992). On the constructive aspects of
political and popular backlashes against activist courts, see Robert Post & Reva Siegel,

Roe Rage: Democratic Constitutionalism and Backlash, 42 HARV. C.R-C.L. L. REV. 373
(2007).

134 FORDHAM INTERNATIONAL LAWJOURNAL

[Vol. 36:1

functions as the primary governing instrument in multicultural
democracies, the search for a legal resolution to socio-cultural
conflicts seems ever more acute.
The European model of constitutional review appears to
possess distinct properties and institutional machineries to
enable the construction of durable socio-cultural compromises.
Generally, under the abstract review process typical of national
legal systems in Western Europe, laws can be referred to
constitutional review during or soon after they were adopted to
ensure their constitutionality and integrality with existing norms
and values. 2 o Under the concrete review process shared by
various nations across the European continent, judicial officials
are to refer to the constitutional court questions about the
constitutionality of existing laws or administrative acts arising in
the course of the litigation process.0' Internal variations aside,
these procedures empower constitutional courts to act as
policymakers and actively counterbalance majority's legislative
actions disadvantaging constitutional guarantees or fundamental
social values. 2
The opportunity to deliberate unbound by specific facts,
identifiable parties or the need to proclaim a winner or a loser,
confers constitutional courts with the capacity to launch the
currently absent constitutional conversation over the social
effects of Europe's changing demography. As "pure oracles of

200. On European review processes, see MAURO CAPPELLETI, THE JUDICIAL

PROCESS IN COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE 132-45 (1989); ViCrOR FERRERES COMELLA,
CONSTITUTIONAL COURTS AND DEMOCRATIC VALUES: A EUROPEAN PERSPECTIVE (2009);
JOHN HENRY MERRYMAN & ROGELIO PEREZ-PERDOMo, THE CIVIL LAW TRADITION 134-

42 (3d ed. 2007); Michel Rosenfeld, ConstitutionalAdjudication in Europe and the Unites
States: Paradoxes and Contrasts, in EUROPEAN AND US CONSTITUTIONALISM, supra note
180, at 197, 199-203; SWEET, supra note 117, at 50-52; John Ferejohn & Pasquale
Pasquino, ConstitutionalAdjudication: Lessons from Europe, 82 TEX. L. REV. 1671, 16711704 (2004).

201. See SWEET, supra note 117, at 45-46.
202. For variations in constitutional review processes, see SWEET, supra note 117,
at 47; Ferejohn & Pasquino, supra note 200, at 86. Several European constitutional
courts also accept personal complaints of basic rights violations, a power recently
granted to the Conseil Constitutionnel (known there as "priority questions of
constitutionality"). See generally CONSTITUTIONAL REVIEW AND LEGISLATION: AN
INTERNATIONAL COMPARISON, supranote 117.
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the constitutional law," 203 these courts also seem relatively
immune toward legislative backlashes, which in the common-law
context have shown to generate judicial tendency to retreat
from rights protection in order to avoid political clipping of
judicial wings. 204 Finally, the European constitutional dialogic
process in the context of abortion reputably demonstrated that
judicial nullifications of politically accepted legislation steered a
middle course and ultimately generated decades-old settled
compromises.
Spearheading compromise building in conflicts pertaining
to the Muslim community would first and foremost require
constitutional courts to guarantee greater safeguards to Islamic
based expression. Yet, following the example of abortion
reforms, these safeguards must be effectuated by attempting the
mutual preservation of competing rights and interests. Reaching
beyond proportional balancing, constitutional courts should
tackle the roots and causes of Muslim disadvantages as well as the
public anxieties across Europe, and dictate detailed policy
frameworks to guide and constrain the legislative process in
accordance with the specific political context of each state.
Recent outcomes of constitutional review demonstrate that
receptive constitutional interpretations pertaining to Islamic
practices so far have met legislative resistance and administrative
defiance. However, according to the refined literature such
circumventions should not be understood as necessarily
negating long term positive progress. Moreover, a compromiseseeking constitutional process modeled after the abortion
examples is yet to be tested as part of the debate over the place
of Islam in the European public sphere. If indeed, Americanbased theories are applicable across the Atlantic, the attempt to
harmonize Muslim interests with the majority's concerns may
hold promise for a more inclusive and culturally serene Western
European future.

203. Alec Stone Sweet, judging judicial Review: Marbury in the Modern Era: Why
Europe Refected American Judicial Review and Why It May Not Matter, 101 MICH. L. REV.
2744, 2771 (2003).
204. See Mark Tushnet, New Forms ofJudicial Review and the Persistence of RightsAnd Democracy-Based Worries, 38 WAKE FOREST L. REv. 813, 820-30 (2003).

